Staying, Leaving, or Returning? Conflict Resolution Preferences and Migration among Ukrainian Women

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Abstract

Little is known in the literature about non-economic factors that might shape migrant selectivity. This study examines how preferences for resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict relate to the migration patterns and intentions of Ukrainians following the Russian full-scale aggression. Drawing on the concepts of place utility and migration decision-making models, we analyse data from the *OneUA* survey, which was collected around six months after Russia's full-scale invasion among almost 25,000 Ukrainian women residing in Ukraine and abroad. Our results, based on a series of logistic regressions, suggest that Ukrainian women favouring a military solution to the conflict are more likely to remain in their pre-war residence in Ukraine rather than being internally displaced (i.e., IDP) or moving abroad (i.e., refugees). Moreover, among women forced to leave the country as refugees those who favour a military solution, exhibit a stronger intention to return. Conversely, among women still in Ukraine, those who favour a military solution less are more likely to consider international migration. Our study advances research on self-selection into migration based on non-economic factors, emphasising the role of political perceptions in displacement and resettlement patterns in conflict-affected regions.

Keywords: stayers, internal displacement, refugees, migration intentions, migrant selectivity, political preferences, Ukraine.

Introduction

One ongoing debate in migration research concerns the issues of immigrant self-selection into migration and the role of this selection in immigrant integration in receiving societies (Kogan & Kosyakova, 2023). Migrant selectivity, conceptually defined as a phenomenon in which migrants are non-randomly drawn from the population distribution at origin, implies that stayers and leavers systematically differ in their characteristics. These characteristics encompass skills relevant in the labour market, such as education or labour market experience, individual attributes, such as motivation or resilience (e.g. Borjas, 1987; Polavieja et al., 2018), personality traits (Ayhan et al., 2020; Jaeger et al., 2010; Jokela, 2009) and cultural norms and perceptions (Fuchs, 2022; Fuchs et al., 2021).

One potentially influential yet understudied factor in migrant self-selection is migrants' political stance on the fate of their origin countries (for notable exceptions, see Etling et al., 2020; Lam, 2002; Ozaltin et al., 2020). This paper addresses that gap in the literature by examining how individual preferences to the resolution of a military conflict in the home country relate to two outcomes: their current migration status and migration intentions. We explore this research question in the context of Ukraine, a country which has faced full-scale Russian aggression since 24 February 2022. From the start of this hot phase of Russia's war in Ukraine until January 2023, almost 6 million Ukrainians, the vast majority being women and children, have been displaced within Ukraine and almost 8 million have sought protection in neighbouring and more distant countries – numbers unprecedented in post-World War II Europe (UNHCR, 2023).

The extraordinary situation sparked by the war in Ukraine has prompted the European Union to ease restrictions on longer-term settlement, creating legal security for Ukrainian refugees.

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As a result, Ukrainian refugees were granted temporary protection without any formal asylum procedure (De Coninck, 2022). Preferential conditions of settlement within the EU and other countries reduced migration costs and created favourable conditions for Ukrainians fleeing the war. Not all Ukrainians seized this opportunity, suggesting that there are differences in the characteristics of those Ukrainians who chose to stay in Ukraine and those who went abroad (Kosyakova et al., 2025; Van Tubergen, Kogan, et al., 2024). Such selectivity is also pronounced in whether these Ukrainians plan to return home or stay in a safe Western country (Van Tubergen, Wachter, et al., 2024).

Contributing to the body of research on the role of non-economic factors in migration decision-making (e.g. Ayhan et al., 2020; Fuchs, 2022; Jaeger et al., 2010; Jokela, 2009) and the literature on selectivity in forced migration (Aksoy & Poutvaara, 2021; Kosyakova et al., 2025; Spörlein et al., 2020; Van Tubergen, Kogan, et al., 2024), this paper proceeds in two steps. First, we explore whether there are differences between Ukrainians who stayed in their home, those who were displaced within Ukraine, and those who sought refuge abroad, regarding their preferences for the resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict. Second, we focus on the association between preferences for the resolution of the conflict and their future migration decisions. The latter part of the analysis enables us to test a number of theoretically driven hypotheses regarding conflict resolution preferences and individual migration intentions, differentiating between decisions to return home and stayers, and internally displaced decisions to leave the home country at war. The study's focus is on women, as they make up the overwhelming majority of displaced Ukrainians.

Theoretical and contextual background

Refugee selectivity

A long-established finding in migration research is that immigrants are "not a random sample of the population at origin" (Lee, 1966, p. 56), but a self-selected group, different from the average population in the country of origin (Feliciano, 2020). Overall, the migration literature predicts the favourable self-selection of (economic) migrants with respect to labour market relevant skills, both observable and unobservable, age and education level being examples of the former, and motivation, resilience and health, of the latter (e.g. Borjas, 1987; Polavieja et al., 2018).

The recent surge in refugees travelling to Western countries has increased research interest in refugee selection patterns (e.g. Birgier et al., 2018; Buber-Ennser et al., 2016), including the self-selection of refugees fleeing conflict zones (e.g. Braithwaite et al., 2021; Schon, 2019), or comparisons of the selectivity patterns between refugees and economic migrants (Spörlein et al., 2020). Building on classical work on the mitigating role of forced migration for immigrant selectivity profiles (Borjas, 1987; Chiswick, 1999), recent theoretical accounts in economics emphasise the role of risks in refugee migration decisions and resulting selectivity patterns (Aksoy & Poutvaara, 2021). More specifically, these accounts propose that the extent of selectivity among refugees is determined by the combined risks of remaining in the origin country and of relocating to a new destination (Aksoy & Poutvaara, 2021).

Research has repeatedly emphasised the importance of non-economic considerations in the refugees' decision-making, not least due to the larger weight humanitarian migrants assign to non-economic aspects, such as safety, lack of persecution, or ability to re-unite with the family (FitzGerald & Arar, 2018). Particularly for refugees, who often flee for fear of violence or because of ethnic, religious or political persecution (Kosyakova & Brücker, 2020), the dissonance of their value-sets with those of the origin country and a stronger affinity in attitudes and perceptions with potential destination countries might be a driver of migration and explain the choice of destination (Ferwerda & Gest, 2021) (for the case of voluntary migration, see Etling et al., 2020).

Recent empirical research has indeed demonstrated considerable selectivity among refugees heading to Western countries in terms of their values and orientation. For instance, stronger liberal attitudes towards gender equality were attested for refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan to

Austria (e.g., Buber-Ennser et al., 2016) and Germany (e.g., Fuchs, 2022; Fuchs et al., 2021). Using data from the IAB-BAMF-SOEP survey and from the World Values Survey, Fuchs et al. (2021) further report stronger adherence to liberal democracies and values among refugees arriving in Germany in 2015–16 compared to their counterparts in the origin countries. Relying on a conjoint experiment on prospective migrant destination preferences from five sending countries of the Middle East and North Africa, Ferwerda and Gest (2021) likewise find that liberal democratic governance was named among the most highly ranked noneconomic values.

Several studies explored the relationship between political attitudes and migration intentions. For example, Lam (2002) found that residents lacking confidence in both the economic and political conditions of Hong Kong exhibited the highest propensity to leave the country. The marginal effect of political confidence on migration intentions was greater than that of economic confidence. Similarly, Etling et al. (2020) investigated the connection between dissatisfaction with domestic political processes and migration aspirations among young individuals in Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia following the Arab Spring. Their findings indicate that a significant discrepancy between political ideals and political realities, compounded by perceptions of poor government performance, fosters a stronger desire to migrate. Notably, young individuals with a pronounced preference for democratic governance were found to be significantly more inclined to consider emigration compared to remaining in their home countries. Ozatlin et al. (2019) examined the relationship between patriotism among Iraqis – measured through the variable "inter-ethnic conflicts in Iraq could be resolved through negotiations" – and their intention to emigrate. Their analysis, however, finds no evidence to support an association between this measure of patriotism and individual migration intentions.

Despite the existing research, the specific role of political preferences as a determinant of migration decisions and intentions remains unexamined in the context of Ukraine. This gap in the literature is particularly striking given the significance of the full-fledged war in Ukraine, marked by its unprecedented scale, intensity, and location within Europe. The conflict has triggered one of the largest and most rapid population displacements since World War II, underscoring the need to understand the political factors influencing migration in this unique and ongoing crisis.

Russian-Ukrainian conflict since 2014

To understand the origins of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict culminating in Russia's full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, we must look back to early 2014. Mass pro-European protests in Kyiv led to the ousting of the pro-Russian Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych (Shore, 2018), sparking pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine's eastern and southern regions (O'Loughlin et al., 2017). Russia's annexation of Crimea and its sponsorship of separatists in Donbas proved most consequential.

In February 2014, Russian troops stationed in Crimea, supported by unmarked Russian forces, seized key infrastructure (Kofman et al., 2017; Plokhy, 2023). An internationally disputed referendum followed, and was deemed illegal by Ukrainian law and widely condemned. Around the same time, fears of diminished influence in Kyiv triggered unrest in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Donbas) (Giuliano, 2018). Russia capitalised on these tensions, legitimising separatism and undermining Ukraine's authority (e.g. Kofman et al., 2017; O'Loughlin et al., 2017; Plokhy, 2023). After violent clashes covertly supported by Russia, pro-Russian separatists declared the "Donetsk People's Republic" (DNR) and "Luhansk People's Republic" (LNR) (Sasse & Lackner, 2018). Both depended on Russian military, economic, and political backing, including Russian nationals in key positions. Ukraine's attempts to retake these areas were unsuccessful, sparking a fierce conflict with direct Russian involvement (Snyder, 2018; Wilson, 2016). By early 2015, the war had largely frozen (Åtland, 2020; Kofman et al., 2017).

Following a major military buildup, Russia recognised the DNR and LNR as independent on 21 February 2022 (Plokhy, 2023). Three days later, Russian forces invaded Ukraine, prompting global condemnation, new sanctions, and an international coalition supporting Ukraine (Antezza et al., 2022). By mid-summer 2022, Russian troops had occupied much of Ukraine's south coast and major parts of Donbas, in addition to Crimea, the DNR and LNR (Plokhy, 2023).

Scenarios for ending hostilities and resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict – closely linked to the resolution of the Donbas and Crimea issues – have been intensively debated within Ukrainian society. Surveys conducted just before the full-scale invasion also showed a strong readiness among Ukrainians to defend their country (Reznik, 2023), especially among those with Ukrainian-speaking identity and pro-Western orientations (EU/NATO). Following the outbreak of the war, polls conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in May and July 2022 indicated that 82–84 per cent of respondents in regions under Ukrainian control opposed relinquishing any territory, even if it prolonged the war (KIIS, 2022). In May 2022, 61 per cent supported fighting until all territory, including Crimea, was reclaimed; 12 per cent excluded Crimea; and only 9 per cent were willing to concede territory lost since February 2022 (KIIS, 2022).

Theoretical mechanisms and expectations

The current study examines how individual preferences for resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict relate to migration status and future migration intentions. While both migration status and future migration intentions could potentially be analysed using similar conceptual frameworks, in testing our hypotheses, we focus on migration intentions, as they represent the initial stage of migration decision-making. Beyond the methodological considerations discussed later, studying migration intentions provides valuable insights. First, intentions respond more rapidly to external events – such as shifts in public opinion – than actual migration behaviours. Second, they capture individual aspirations without being constrained by practical barriers, whereas actual migration outcomes depend on both aspirations and capabilities (Carling, 2002; Carling & Schewel, 2018; de Haas, 2021). Third, analysing migration intentions helps to address immobility biases (Erdal et al., 2023; Schewel, 2020) by accounting for individuals who wish to migrate but are unable to leave, such as those restricted by military regulations.

To understand how preferences for resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict might be related to the migration intentions of Ukrainian women, we draw on the socio-psychological concepts of place utility (Wolpert, 1965) and migration decision-making models (Carling, 2024; Cassarino, 2004; Tjaden, 2022). According to Wolpert (1965), individuals evaluate the utility of their place of residence based on past experience and the sense of connectedness they have with the place and its people. In stressful situations, individuals may either lower their aspirations or move to a different location (Kalter, 2000; Wolpert, 1966). Although some scholars have questioned the usefulness of place utility due to its subjective nature (López-Carr & Phillips, 2015), this very subjectivity can be illuminating when aiming to comprehend migration intentions in conflict situations.

Place utility in the home country – often tied to emotional attachment, identity, and a sense of shared future – is closely related to the concept of patriotism. Here we refer to constructive patriotism (defined as love and attachment to one's nation) as opposed to nationalism (which is marked by a sense of national superiority and often hostility toward other nations) (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989).

Empirical research supports the role of patriotism in shaping place utility. For instance, Lewicka (2008) found that Ukrainians with a strong sense of national identity are more attached to sites of symbolic importance to their nation. This suggests that patriotic attachment to the home country can influence individuals' perceptions of place utility, potentially affecting their migration intentions. However, the extent to which patriotism affects these intentions is debated. On the one hand, strong national attachment may discourage migration by fostering a sense of belonging and obligation to remain. Conversely, disillusionment with unmet patriotic ideals, particularly in contexts of political instability or conflict, could encourage migration. Ozaltin et al. (2020), for example, found no significant effect of patriotism on migration intentions among Iraqis, possibly indicating that the opposing mechanisms can cancel each other out.

Turning to broader migration decision-making, we adopt a framework that views migration as contingent upon perceived advantages (e.g. political stability, secure income, education chances, healthcare access, feeling at home etc.) at both origin and potential destinations. The framework also considers the monetary and non-monetary costs associated with migration, as well as the

perceived likelihood of realising the benefits of migration versus facing risks associated with immobility (Tjaden, 2022). Therefore, the higher the perceived risk of failing to secure well-being at home relative to opportunities abroad, the more likely people are to migrate. In forced migration contexts, non-economic factors, such as personal safety, often carry greater weight (FitzGerald & Arar, 2018). In the present study, we contribute to this literature by highlighting the significance of political preferences in conflict scenarios.

We argue that the preferred pathways for resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict may motivate individual migration or return decisions. In mid-2022, two main outcomes seemed possible: a *military-based approach*, aiming to retake all annexed territories and restore Ukrainian sovereignty, and a *negotiation-based approach*, which would necessitate considerable concessions from Ukraine (including the permanent loss of regions like Donbas and Crimea). The military route entails high risk of casualties and destruction but offers potentially significant future benefits for those who place high subjective value on a united, free and democratic Ukraine. Conversely, negotiations might reduce hostilities sooner but would likely involve permanent territorial losses and compromises on Ukrainian sovereignty – an outcome that could be more acceptable to those with lower tolerance of the risks of ongoing warfare.

Individual political preferences also reflect how aligned or misaligned a person feels with majority public opinion (Pless et al., 2023). During summer 2022, the majority in Ukraine strongly favoured full territorial liberation (KIIS, 2022), which may have encouraged people to conform to this stance. Ukrainians dissenting from the mainstream view could feel socially and emotionally marginalised. Living abroad, however, may make it easier to hold or express views that diverge from the dominant discourse at home.

Assuming that expressed preferences regarding resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are linked to both place utility levels and to the perceived risk of ongoing warfare, we expect the migration and return intentions of Ukrainian women to vary accordingly. Figure 1 illustrates the expected relationship.



Figure 1. Conflict resolution preferences and migration intentions

Source: own presentation

More specifically, we propose that Ukrainian women residing in Ukraine whose political preferences deviate from the prevailing public sentiment (i.e., full liberation of Ukraine) or those unable to further endure the risks associated with the ongoing war are more likely to express the wish to leave their homes and go abroad in search of safer locations. This aligns with Mironova et al. (2019), who found that in conflict zones, risk-averse individuals often opt to leave, whereas those more tolerant of risk may stay. Therefore, we expect that:

> (*H1*) Among women residing in Ukraine – either stayers or IDPs – those who exhibit lower support for a military resolution of the conflict (compared to higher support) are more likely to express an intention to leave as opposed to staying in Ukraine.

Several months into the war, some Ukrainian women who found refuge outside Ukraine might shift their opinion on conflict resolution towards the military option, thereby aligning with the dominant sentiment on this issue in Ukraine. Here we expect that:

> (*H2*) Among women residing outside Ukraine – i.e. refugees – those who exhibit greater support for military resolution of the conflict (compared to lower support) are more likely to express an intention to return home as opposed to staying abroad.

Finally, in the ongoing military conflict between Ukraine and Russia, some Ukrainians may display indifference towards the fate of Donbas and Crimea, showing zero or minimal support for both military and diplomatic solutions, which, following our theoretical argumentation, indicates their low place utility for Ukraine. Therefore, we expect that:

> (*H3*) Among women residing outside Ukraine, those who exhibit lower levels of support for both military and diplomatic solutions to the war (compared to otherwise) are likely to express a particularly low intention of returning home, compared to the rest of Ukrainian women.

Research methodology

Data collection and sample

The empirical analyses are based on the *OneUA* survey (Kogan et al., 2022), collected between 14 July and 18 August 2022 through self-administered computer-assisted web interviews (CAWI). Three target groups were surveyed: (1) Ukrainians who remained in their pre-war places of residence, (2) internally displaced persons (IDPs), and (3) Ukrainian refugees abroad.

Finding a cross-national sampling frame that includes both the general population and mobile individuals is challenging (e.g., Andreß & Careja, 2018), especially in conflict settings. *OneUA* addressed this by using Meta ads (Facebook, Instagram, and Messenger) to target Ukrainian- or Russian-speaking users in Ukraine and European countries with substantial Ukrainian refugee populations. Previous research supports this method for effectively capturing migration behaviour (e.g., Pötzschke, 2022; Rocheva et al., 2022). While applying the same algorithm across countries reduces sampling bias, the non-probability sample limits generalisability. All advertisements were in Ukrainian[1] to deter interference from Russian trolls, and linked directly to an external survey page. Additional participants entered via the project's Facebook page or invitations from other respondents (snowballing). As a result, *OneUA* female participants come from Ukraine, as well as from both Western host countries – Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, Czech Republic, Italy, Romania, Hungary, Moldova (the survey's target countries), and Slovakia, Spain, France, Austria, Switzerland, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, the US, Canada, and Israel, as well as aggressor countries, Russia and Belarus.[2]

1 Even though a considerable proportion of the Ukrainian citizens consider Russian their mother tongue, proficiency in the Ukrainian language is widespread enough that anyone in Ukraine is able to answer the questionnaire in Ukrainian (e.g. Kulyk, 2016).

2 All benchmark models were replicated without Russia and Belarus, which did not change our main results (see Appendix Tables A3 and A4).

We focus on adult women (18+) with Ukrainian citizenship who, after 24 February 2022, either remained in their pre-war residence, relocated within Ukraine, or moved abroad. Our analytic sample was selected based on citizenship, gender, age (birth years 1942–2004), pre-war residence, and migration status, including destination after 24 February 2022. As shown in Table A1 in the Appendix, 24,756 of the 57,757 survey starters met these criteria.

Measures

In the following section, we describe the variables used in our analyses. Descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Summary statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min/Max
DEPENDENT VARIABLES				
Migration status	24756			
Stayer		0.27	-	0/1
IDP		0.19	-	0/1
Refugee		0.54	-	0/1
Migration intentions of people in Ukraine: Intending to leave Ukraine (vs. remain in Ukraine)	10505	0.07	-	0/1
Migration intentions of refugees: Intending to return to Ukraine (vs. remain abroad)	12716	0.67	-	0/1
FOCAL VARIABLE				
Support for negotiations	22120	3.74	2.20	1/7
Support for a military solution	22304	5.14	1.92	1/7
CONTROL VARIABLES				
Birth country	24037			
Ukraine		0.93	-	0/1
Russian Federation and Belarus		0.04	-	0/1
Other countries		0.02	-	0/1
Born in Crimea or Donbas	23844	0.12	-	0/1
Multiple citizenship	24753	0.01	-	0/1
Age	24756	38.57	13.13	18-78
Number of children	24518	1.33	1.00	0-4
Partnership status	23896			
No partner		0.39	-	0/1
Partner residing in Ukraine		0.50	-	0/1
Partner residing outside of Ukraine		0.11	-	0/1
Education:	23128			
Incomplete (low) secondary or below		0.05	-	0/1
Full secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary		0.36	-	0/1
Tertiary or higher		0.59	-	0/1
Finances in summer 2021	22878	2.83	0.86	1–5
With work experience	23187	0.71	-	0/1
English language skills	23243	2.13	1.12	1–5

Source: OneUA (2022)

Dependent variables. In our empirical analysis, we consider two outcomes – migration status at the time of the survey and future migration intentions – resulting in three dependent variables:

The first dependent variable is respondent *migration status* at the time of the survey, categorised into: (1) Stayers – those who have stayed in their pre-war place of residence since the outbreak of the war; (2) IDPs – those who remained in Ukraine but no longer live in the same pre-war residence place since the outbreak of the war, and (3) refugees – those who migrated internationally. Among our female respondents, 27 per cent stayed in their pre-war place of residence after 24 February 2022, 19 per cent were internally displaced, and 54 per cent were residing abroad. The analysis for the first dependent variable will be carried out descriptively because political preferences expressed at the time of the survey may not explain the migration decisions taken several months earlier. Particularly among refugees, public opinions in host countries could shape their political preferences.

In contrast, migration intentions could be affected simultaneously by expressed political preferences. Here we differentiate between two dependent variables:

Intentions to move abroad (vs. remaining in Ukraine) is the second dependent variable, based on self-reported intentions for international migration among respondents identified as stayers or IDPs. Respondents were asked: "Do you currently have plans to migrate to a different country?" (yes/no). Those who answered "yes" were asked a follow-up question: "What country are you planning to migrate to?" The variable is coded as 1 if a respondent intended to move abroad and 0 if they planned to stay in Ukraine or migrate internally. Among women still residing in Ukraine after 24 February 2022, 7 per cent expressed a willingness to move abroad.

For respondents living outside Ukraine at the time of the survey, we consider whether they intend to return to and live in Ukraine. The main question was: "Are you intending to return to and live in Ukraine?" (yes, no, don't know). We also considered responses to the question: "Do you currently have plans to migrate to a different country?" If respondents answered "yes" and named Ukraine as the destination, this was also coded as an intention to return. Similarly, *intentions to return to Ukraine (vs. remaining abroad)* – our third dependent variable – is equal to 1 if respondents expressed a definite intention to return permanently, and 0 if they did not or were uncertain. Among female respondents who left Ukraine after 24 February 2022, and were abroad during the survey, 67 per cent indicated plans to return.

Focal variables. Preferences for conflict resolution are measured via two focal (independent) variables in our analyses: *support for a military solution* and *support for negotiations* between Ukraine and Russia over Donbas and Crimea. Following our theoretical frame, we treat military and diplomatic preferences as distinct dimensions rather than opposing ends of the same spectrum.

The exact wording of the four questions used to construct the variable is presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. Support for a military solution is assessed through two self-reported items measuring preferences for liberating Donbas and Crimea by military means (degree of internal consistency measured by Cronbach's alpha = 0.74). Similarly, support for negotiations is captured through two items assessing preferences for regaining control over these territories diplomatically (degree of internal consistency measured by Cronbach's alpha = 0.76). All four items use a seven-point Likert scale, with "1" indicating the lowest and "7" the highest levels of support for the respective item. Descriptive statistics (Table 1) indicate that the majority of Ukrainians favour a military solution, with a mean score of 5.14, compared to 3.74 for a diplomatic resolution. As indicated in Figure A1 in the Appendix, there is a negative and statistically significant – but far from perfect – correlation between the two variables, indicating that Ukrainian women expressing higher values for a military solution are more likely to report lower values for negotiation as a solution.

Control variables are described in the following. Among the sociodemographic variables, we account for *country of birth* aggregated into: (1) Ukraine (reference category, 93 per cent of the respondents), (2) the Russian Federation and Belarus (4 per cent), (3) other countries of the former Soviet Union or other unspecified countries (2 per cent). Additionally, an indicator for *being born in Crimea or Donbas* (Donetsk or Luhansk), which is based on self-reported information about county

of birth, is meant to capture previous exposure to the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the respondents' potential special sentiments towards these regions. Notably, 12 per cent of female respondents in the OneUA sample reported being born in one of these regions. *Multiple citizenship* is a dummy indicator for holding the citizenship of (at least) one other country besides Ukraine. This applies to only 1% of female respondents in the sample.

Age is a continuous variable measuring the difference between the survey year (2022) and self-reported birth year. The average age in the sample is 38.6 years. *Number of children* is a continuous variable capturing the number of children (biological, adopted, foster children or stepchildren), with zero indicating no children and four indicating more than 3 children. The average number of children in the sample is 1.33. Self-reported *partnership status* is a categorical variable capturing the respondents' partnership status (married or in a partnership) and residence of the partner with the three categories: (1) no partner (39 per cent), (2) partner residing in Ukraine (50 per cent), (3) partner residing outside Ukraine (11 per cent). Controlling for demographic characteristics, such as the number of children or the presence of a partner in Ukraine, is important since those with family in Ukraine could have different migration aspirations and capabilities due to family considerations. Preferences for conflict resolution among these women might also be related to family considerations.

The following variables serve as proxies for the respondents' human capital, capturing their potential for economic success and employment opportunities, whether in Ukraine or abroad. Self-reported *educational attainment* is represented by a categorical variable capturing the respondents' highest level of education or training attained in Ukraine with three aggregated categories: (1) low secondary with or without vocational education or below (reference category, 5 per cent), (2) full secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary with or without vocational education (36 per cent), (3) bachelor's degree or higher (59 per cent). We further control for the self-reported *relative financial situation in Ukraine in summer 2021*, a continuous variable measured on a 1–5 scale (1 = "well below average," 5 = "well above average"; mean = 2.83). We also include a dummy variable for *employment in summer 2021*, with 71% reporting such work experience. *Self-reported English language skills* capture the respondent's English proficiency ranging between 1 "not at all" to 5 "very well" (mean 2.13).

Given that the war affected the regions of Ukraine differently (see Section 2), we account for the fixed effects of the region (*oblast*) the respondent reported as residing in on 24 February 2022. Likewise, the fixed effects for *survey week* participation and *survey type* (advertisement, Facebook page, and snowball)[3] are included to absorb any systematic differences related to the survey design and period of collection. Moreover, fixed effects for region of residence on 24 February 2022 and survey week likely capture both regional and temporal variation in the progress of the war.

Empirical strategy

Our analysis follows three steps. First, we examine migration status during the survey period using a multinomial logistic regression model, linking it to conflict resolution preferences while accounting for group differences with robust standard errors. Second, among those who remained in Ukraine, we analyse their intentions to migrate abroad rather than seek refuge within Ukraine. Third, for refugees abroad at the time of the survey, we assess their intention to return to Ukraine. The latter two steps use logistic regression models with robust standard errors.

Given that our focal variables are correlated, we assessed multicollinearity using variance inflation factors (VIFs) and tolerance scores for all model variables. With the exception of age and age-squared, all VIF values – including those for *preference for a military solution* and *preference for negotiations* – were well below the commonly used threshold of 10, indicating no serious multicollinearity concerns. As expected, age and age-squared showed high VIFs (ranging from 41 to 47), which is typical due to their mathematical relationship. However, including both terms is

3 We replicate our benchmark models excluding respondents who entered the survey via snowball element or via the Facebook page since they might be persons who do not even use social media (at least not Facebook or Instagram). Our results remained robust to these exclusions (see Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix).

necessary to capture the nonlinear effect of age on migration. For further details, see Appendix B.

To address item nonresponse, we apply multiple imputation via chained equations (van Buuren, 2012), generating 20 imputed datasets. Following Rubin's (1987) method, we combine results across datasets considering the imputation variances within and between the imputed data sets. Respondents with missing information on migration intentions were considered in the multiple imputation but not in the analyses on migration intentions. For focal variables, missing values in original variables were imputed and used to create mean scores. Table 1 (column 2) shows the extent of missing data across measures.

Results

Descriptive evidence on preferences for conflict resolution

Figure 2 visualises the conflict resolution preferences of female Ukrainian respondents across the three migration outcomes. Among those who remained in their pre-war homes (stayers), support for a military solution is the highest, while preference for negotiations is the lowest compared to other groups. IDPs exhibit a level of support for negotiations similar to that of stayers but show significantly less support for a military solution. Refugees show a stronger preference for negotiations and the weakest support for a military solution.



Figure 2. Preferences for conflict resolution by migration status and migration intention (with 95% CIs)

Source: OneUA (2022).

Turning to the migration intentions of individuals in Ukraine (which include stayers and IDPs), we observe that their conflict resolution preferences closely align with those of stayers overall. In turn, Ukrainian women planning to leave Ukraine show greater support for negotiations and less support for a military resolution.

Among refugees, a stronger preference for a diplomatic solution is consistent regardless of return intentions. However, differences emerge regarding the military resolution – refugee women planning to return to Ukraine exhibit considerably higher support for a military resolution compared to those without return intentions.

Multivariate results: Association between preferences for conflict resolution and migration patterns

In the following section, we re-assess the association between preferences for conflict resolution and migration status at the time of the survey accounting for sociodemographic group differences. Table 2 visualises the results of the multinomial logistic regression, where migration status serves as the dependent variable.

Table 2. Multinomial regression of the probability of staying in pre-war places of residence (reference category), being an IDP, or a refugee, in odds ratio

	Model 1	
	IDP	*Refugee*
	...vs. stayer	
Support for negotiations	0.99	1.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Support for a military solution	0.97**	0.96***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Controls	YES	
Observations	24756	

Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-sided tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses. For the list of controls included in the models, see the section *Measures*. For the stepwise inclusion of focal and control variables, refer to Table A3 in the Appendix. For full models, refer to Table A4 in the Appendix.

Source: OneUA (2022).

The findings indicate that a stronger preference for negotiations as a means of resolving the conflict is associated with higher odds of being a refugee rather than staying at home (2%-increase for one-unit increase in preference for negotiations), whereas it is not significantly related to an increased probability of resettlement within Ukraine. In turn, increased preferences for a military conflict resolution is negatively correlated with the probability of internal or international resettlement, as opposed to remaining in one's pre-war residence: one-unit increase in support for a military solution is associated with a 3% decrease (1 - 0.97 = 0.03 or 3%) in the likelihood of being IDP and a 4% decrease in likelihood of being a refugee. Taken together, these results suggest that, compared to stayers, refugees exhibit both greater support for negotiations and lower support for a military solution. In contrast, the primary distinction between IDPs and stayers lies in the former group's slightly lower support for a military resolution.

The results for the control variables are presented in Table A4 in the Appendix. Consistent with previous findings for Ukrainian refugees (Brücker et al., 2023; Buber-Ennser et al., 2016; Kosyakova et al., 2025; Van Tubergen, Kogan, et al., 2024), multiple citizenships, higher education, better financial resources, and prewar residence in eastern oblasts heavily affected by warfare are associated with a higher likelihood of being displaced, and these factors are even stronger predictors of becoming a refugee rather than an IDP. In contrast, age, the number of children, having a partner residing outside Ukraine and stronger English language skills are associated specifically with a higher probability of being a refugee, but not an IDP. Conversely, prior work experience, having a partner in Ukraine, residing in central and western Ukraine on 24 February 2022, and being born in Crimea or Donbas – which may signal prior exposure to conflict – are positively associated with the likelihood of remaining in one's prewar residence in Ukraine ("stayers").

Multivariate results: Association between preferences for conflict resolution and migration intentions

Next, we test our hypotheses regarding the association between preferences for conflict resolution and Ukrainian women's migration intentions, given that our respondents reside either in Ukraine (as IDPs or stayers) or abroad (as refugees). The results presented in Table 3 suggest that support for a military solution is a significant predictor of migration intentions, whereas preference for negotiations is not.

Specifically, among Ukrainian women residing in Ukraine, those with stronger support for a military solution exhibit lower probability of intending international migration, supporting Hypothesis *H1*. Among Ukrainian female refugees living abroad, favouring a military resolution results in a higher probability of planning to return to Ukraine, providing empirical support for Hypothesis *H2*.

Table 3. Logistic regression of the probability of intending to (1) leave Ukraine (reference category: stay in Ukraine), and (2) return to Ukraine (reference category: stay abroad), in odds ratio

	Model 2	**Model 3**
	People in Ukraine: *Intending to leave Ukraine vs. remain in Ukraine*	Refugees abroad: *Intending to return to Ukraine vs. remain abroad*
Support for negotiations	1.01	1.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Support for a military solution	0.92***	1.05***
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Controls	YES	YES
Observations	10501	12715

Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-sided tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses. For the list of controls included in the models, see the section *Measures*. For the stepwise inclusion of focal and control variables, refer to Table A5 in the Appendix. For full models, refer to Table A6 in the Appendix.

Source: OneUA (2022).

The results for the control variables (see Table A6 in the Appendix) show that partnership status emerges as a strong predictor of migration intentions: individuals with a partner in Ukraine are more likely to express an intention to remain, while those whose partner resides abroad are more inclined to leave the country (if currently in Ukraine) or to remain abroad (if they are refugees). Furthermore, among women still in Ukraine, key predictors of international migration intentions are younger age, prior work experience and better English language skills. Among refugees, intentions to remain abroad are more likely among those with multiple citizenships, older age, and stronger English language skills. In contrast, a better financial situation in Ukraine prior the war is associated with the intention to return. Furthermore, regional differences are noticeable depending on where respondents resided on 24 February 2022.

Finally, we compare the predicted migration intentions of women residing in Ukraine and those abroad, based on their preferences for military or negotiation solutions to the Russia-Ukraine conflict (see Table 4). Predicted probabilities are calculated for all extreme combinations of these preferences while holding all other covariates at their means. This approach allows for a direct comparison of migration intention conditional on the respondents' current migration status.

Among Ukrainian women residing in Ukraine, those strongly favouring negotiations but weakly

supporting a military solution most likely intend to leave the country. Similarly, those with weak support for both options also show a comparably high likelihood of migration intentions. In contrast, the highest probability of staying is observed among those with weak support for negotiations and strong support for a military solution.

Among women residing abroad, those who strongly support both military and diplomatic solutions are most likely to express an intention to return to Ukraine. Additionally, individuals who strongly support a military solution but show weak support for negotiations exhibit a similarly high likelihood of intending to return. In contrast, those with weak preferences for both options or strong support for negotiations but weak support for a military solution, are more likely to remain abroad.

These findings partially contradict the final hypothesis *H3*, which predicts that refugees with the lowest support for both military and diplomatic solutions would be least likely to return to Ukraine. Instead, the probability they would return is comparable to those strongly favouring negotiations but weakly supporting a military solution.

Table 4. Predicted probability of intending to (1) leave Ukraine (reference category: remaining in Ukraine), and (2) return to Ukraine (reference category: staying abroad), based on logistic regressions in Table 3

		Predictive probabilities by preferences of conflict resolution based on intentions to …					
Preferences of conflict resolution		… **Model 2**			… **Model 3**		
		People in Ukraine:			Refugees abroad:		
		Pr(Leave Ukraine)			*Pr(Return to Ukraine)*		
Negotiation	*Military solution*	Predicted value	[95% conf. interval]		Predicted value	[95% conf. interval]	
Weak (= 1)	Weak (= 1)	9.85	[7.61	12.08]	63.31	[60.21	66.40]
Weak (= 1)	Strong (= 7)	6.31	[5.56	7.07]	69.25	[67.85	70.65]
Strong (= 7)	Weak (= 1)	10.33	[8.76	11.91]	63.41	[61.36	65.47]
Strong (= 7)	Strong (= 7)	6.64	[5.40	7.88]	69.34	[67.18	71.51]
		Pr(Remain in Ukraine)			*Pr(Remain abroad)*		
Negotiation	*Military solution*	Predicted value	[95% conf. interval]		Predicted value	[95% conf. interval]	
Weak (= 1)	Weak (= 1)	90.15	[87.92	92.39]	36.69	33.60	39.79
Weak (= 1)	Strong (= 7)	93.69	[92.93	94.44]	30.75	29.35	32.15
Strong (= 7)	Weak (= 1)	89.67	[88.09	91.24]	36.59	34.53	38.64
Strong (= 7)	Strong (= 7)	93.36	[92.12	94.60]	30.66	28.49	32.82

Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-sided tests). Robust standard errors. For the list of controls included in the models, see the section *Measures*.

Source: OneUA (2022).

Supplementary analyses: region-specific preferences for conflict resolution and migration intentions

In the main analyses, we captured preferences for a diplomatic or military solution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict using an index that combines attitudes toward resolving both the Donbas and Crimea issues. However, the KIIS polls suggest a stronger societal consensus in Ukraine for military de-occupation of Donbas compared to Crimea (KIIS, 2022). To explore whether settlement patterns vary depending on the respondents' attitudes to each region, we replicate our models separately for Donbas or Crimea preferences (see Tables A7 and A8 in the Appendix). Our results indeed show that, unlike in the main models on migration intentions (Table A8 in the Appendix), support for military action in Crimea among refugees has a weaker effect on their intention to return to Ukraine as opposed to remaining abroad (Table A7 in the Appendix). Additionally, IDPs and stayers do not significantly differ in their support for a military solution for Donbas, holding other factors constant.

Discussion

The question of how to end Russia's war against Ukraine has shaped public debate since 2014 and intensified after the full-scale invasion in 2022. In May 2022, 82% opposed territorial concessions, rising to 87% by February 2023, ahead of Ukraine's anticipated counteroffensive. However, following setbacks in that counteroffensive, support for rejecting concessions declined, reaching 51% in the latest KIIS (2025) poll. Among Ukrainians still residing in government-controlled areas, 38% now believe Ukraine may need to cede some territories to secure peace and independence. This shift in public opinion likely reflects war fatigue, mounting casualties, fear of further hardship, and potential increases in emigration.

Our study contributes to this debate by examining how the preferences of Ukrainian women regarding conflict resolution relate to their migration patterns in the early months of the full-scale and their migration intentions at that time. By focusing on political preferences, our study offers new insights for the literature on self-selection in migration decisions, which has traditionally concentrated on demographic, economic and personality factors. Being the only one to date that focuses on the role of political factors in migration decisions among Ukrainians, the study resonates with prior studies linking political views to migration decisions in contexts, such as Hong Kong (Lam, 2002, p. 20), Iraq (Ozaltin et al., 2020), and the Middle East and North Africa (Etling et al., 2020).

Drawing from place utility theory (Wolpert, 1965, 1966) and migration decision-making models (Carling, 2024; Cassarino, 2004; Tjaden, 2022), we analyse original data from the *OneUA* online survey covering Ukrainians both within Ukraine and in various destination countries. Our findings indicate that conflict resolution preferences are associated with individuals' actual migration status, even after accounting for sociodemographic factors. More specifically, Ukrainian women favouring a military solution are less likely to be refugees or IDPs during the survey, and correspondingly more likely to remain in their pre-war place of residence. Conversely, support for diplomacy is linked to a higher likelihood of having migrated abroad during the survey period compared to remaining at home.

As expected, conflict resolution preferences also relate to women's migration intentions. In line with Hypothesis *H1*, female Ukrainian respondents still residing in Ukraine who express lower support for a military solution are more inclined to consider international migration. Among those who have already left, women who support a military solution show stronger intentions to return, consistent with Hypothesis *H2*. Overall, these results suggest that refugees or those willing to become so tend to favour non-military solutions, prioritising stability and calm, and showing less willingness to endure the risks of war for full de-occupation of Crimea and Donbas. Meanwhile, those supporting military solutions – dominant at the war's outset – are more committed to territorial integrity and willing to accept wartime risks, making them less likely to (be willing

to) migrate internationally. Interestingly, our findings partially challenge Hypothesis *H3* that individuals with weak support for both military and diplomatic solutions would have particularly low return intentions. Instead, their likelihood of returning is comparable to those who strongly support negotiations but weakly favour military solutions.

In conclusion, our study underscores the need to consider political preferences – and in general non-economic factors – in understanding displacement and resettlement patterns in conflict-affected areas. While offering these valuable insights, our study has limitations. We relied on place utility and perceived risks in migration decisions, but were unable to directly measure these constructs, rendering our explanations suggestive rather than empirically tested. As with any use of regression models based on survey data, ours are also subject to omitted variable bias. Including variables such as whether the respondents' children remain in Ukraine, whether the respondents possess financial assets, own property or businesses there, or work remotely for a Ukrainian employer, would have helped capture additional mechanisms influencing intentions to stay or migrate, particularly those related to family ties and future orientation toward Ukraine.

Additionally, the use of social media for participant recruitment resulted in a non-probability sample, introducing potential selection biases (Pötzschke, 2022). It is difficult to evaluate the extent of these biases due to the lack of information on the population of interest across multiple destinations. We speculate that, given the Ukrainian-language survey and Meta-based recruitment, we likely under-sampled pro-Russian Ukrainians, residents of occupied territories, and those deported to Russia, where Meta access is restricted. Furthermore, male respondents are clearly underrepresented in the *OneUA* data, making us take the decision to focus solely on Ukrainian women. As a result, we cannot determine whether men's migration decisions are similarly influenced by political preferences. In addition, due to martial law, men aged 18 to 60 were prohibited from leaving Ukraine and subject to potential mobilisation. Limiting the analysis to those few men who were exempt, such as minors, older men, or fathers of three or more children, would result in a highly selective and non-generalisable subsample at least for the population staying in Ukraine. Despite these limitations, social media sampling remains a cost-effective, timely and scalable approach to reaching migrants across multiple countries, particularly in conflict contexts.

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Acknowledgements

We thank the participants of the ECSR Annual Conference in Prague (September, 2023), the ERCOMER seminar in Utrecht (November, 2023), the BiB Population Research Series in Wiesbaden (January, 2023), and the IAB-BiB-ECSR Conference in Nuremberg (May, 2025). Kogan and Van Tubergen are grateful to the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI), the Sustainable Cooperation Program (SCOOP), Utrecht University strategic theme 'Institutions for Open Societies' (IoS), and Mannheim University for funding the OneUA survey. Kosyakova acknowledges the support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG – German Research Foundation) within the project 'Longitudinal Study of Ukrainian Refugees (SUARE). Refugee migration and Labor Market Integration' (project number 519020285).

Replication codes for data preparation and analyses are available at https://osf.io/jwyxq/.

Appendix A



Figure A1. The relationship between support for negotiation and support for military solution. *Note*: Binned scatterplot of the relationship between support for negotiation (vertical axis) and support for military solution (horizontal axis). Individuals are grouped into equally sized bins.

Data: OneUA (2022).

Table A1. Analysis samples after cases were excluded from the original samples

	Persons
Original sample	**57,757**
Cases excluded	
Those who did not report Ukrainian citizenship, while still allowing for the possibility of additional citizenships	13658
Those with birth years outside of the range of 1942 to 2004	1745
Those with incomplete information on the screening questions defining the target population	179
Those who reported living outside of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, or whose living place was missing	3831
Those with missing information on whether they left Ukraine after 24 February 2022	667
Those who left Ukraine before 2022, or whose leaving year was missing	1306
Those with missing information on gender and males, due to the general mobilisation and emigration ban for males aged 18 to 60 in Ukraine	2629
Those whose migration status (i.e., stayers, internally displaced, refugees outside of Ukraine) could not be identified	727
Ukrainians abroad, i.e., Ukrainians who reported to continuously live in the same house or apartment in Ukraine since 24 February 2022, but also to reside abroad at the time of the survey	8262
= Analysis sample	**24,756**

Source: OneUA (2022).

Table A2. Preferences for conflict resolution, original items

Question wording	Statistics				
	Min	Max	Mode	Mean	SD
Ukraine should gain control over Donbas through a negotiation	1	7	3	3.59	2.45
Ukraine should fully liberate Donbas in a military way	1	7	7	5.42	2.05
Ukraine should gain control over Crimea through a negotiation	1	7	4	3.92	2.46
Crimea should be returned to Ukraine in a military way	1	7	5	4.84	2.26

Notes: SD = Standard deviation.

Source: OneUA (2022)

Table A3. Multinomial regression of the probability of staying in pre-war places of residence (reference category), being an IDP, or a refugee, in odds ratio: stepwise inclusion of covariates, full models

	IDP	*Refugee*	*IDP*	*Refugee*	*IDP*	*Refugee*	*IDP*	*Refugee*	*IDP*	*Refugee*	*IDP*	*Refugee*	*IDP*	*Refugee*
	…vs. stayer													
Support for negotiations	1.01	1.05***			0.98	1.02*	0.99	1.03***	0.99	1.02*	1.00	1.04***		
	(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		
Support for a military solution			0.93***	0.91***	0.92***	0.91***	0.94***	0.94***	0.97**	0.96***			0.97*	0.95***
			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)
Controls	NO		NO		NO		NO		YES		YES		YES	
Fixed effects for pre-war oblast of residence, survey week, and survey type	NO		NO		NO		YES		YES		YES		YES	
Observations	24756		24756		24756		24756		24756		24756		24756	

Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-sided tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for country of birth, being born in Crimea or Donbas, age, number of children, partnership status, multiple citizenship, educational attainment, relative financial situation in summer 2021, work in summer 2021, English language skills.

Source: OneUA (2022).

Table A4. Multinomial regression of the probability of staying in pre-war places of residence (reference category), being an IDP, or a refugee, in odds ratio: Full models.

	IDP	*Refugee*
	...vs. stayer	
	Model 1	
Support for negotiations	0.99	1.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Support for military solution	0.97**	0.96***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Birth country (Ref. Ukraine)		
Russian Federation and Belarus	0.86	1.03
	(0.09)	(0.09)
Other countries	0.79	1.21
	(0.12)	(0.14)
Born in Crimea or Donbas	0.83*	0.77***
	(0.06)	(0.05)
Multiple citizenship	1.93**	2.08***
	(0.47)	(0.42)
Age	0.99	1.08***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age squared	1.00	1.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Number of children	1.00	1.07**
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Partnership status (Ref. No partner)		
Partner residing in Ukraine	1.04	0.36***
	(0.05)	(0.01)
Partner outside of Ukraine	1.39	9.42***
	(0.24)	(1.13)
Education (Ref. Incomplete secondary or below)		
Full secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary	1.36**	1.69***
	(0.13)	(0.14)
Tertiary or higher	2.02***	2.79***
	(0.20)	(0.23)
Finances in summer 2021	1.22***	1.32***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
With work experience	0.93	0.91*
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Pre-war oblast of residence (Ref. Kyiv)		
Cherkasy Oblast	0.21***	0.61***
	(0.04)	(0.08)

Chernihiv Oblast	0.48***	0.68***
	(0.06)	(0.08)
Chernivtsi Oblast	0.18***	0.57***
	(0.05)	(0.10)
Autonomous Republic of Crimea	1.32	2.06
	(1.46)	(2.32)
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast	0.37***	1.13
	(0.04)	(0.09)
Donetsk Oblast	2.50***	2.65***
	(0.31)	(0.32)
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast	0.28***	0.53***
	(0.05)	(0.08)
Kharkiv Oblast	1.38***	2.23***
	(0.12)	(0.17)
Kherson Oblast	0.95	0.74**
	(0.10)	(0.08)
Khmelnytskyi Oblast	0.22***	0.37***
	(0.04)	(0.05)
Kyiv Oblast	1.03	1.24**
	(0.08)	(0.09)
Kirovohrad Oblast	0.11***	0.35***
	(0.03)	(0.05)
Lviv Oblast	0.25***	0.59***
	(0.04)	(0.06)
Luhansk Oblast	3.72***	1.63*
	(0.73)	(0.34)
Mykolaiv Oblast	0.74**	1.48***
	(0.08)	(0.14)
Odesa Oblast	0.36***	1.14
	(0.04)	(0.10)
Poltava Oblast	0.30***	0.75**
	(0.04)	(0.08)
Rivne Oblast	0.22***	0.47***
	(0.04)	(0.06)
Sumy Oblast	0.42***	0.69**
	(0.06)	(0.08)
Ternopil Oblast	0.17***	0.52***
	(0.04)	(0.09)
Zakarpattia Oblast	0.12***	0.30***
	(0.03)	(0.05)
Vinnytsia Oblast	0.30***	0.62***
	(0.04)	(0.07)
Volyn Oblast	0.32***	0.45***
	(0.06)	(0.07)
Zaporizhzhia Oblast	0.65***	1.12
	(0.07)	(0.10)

Zhytomyr Oblast	0.52***	0.98
	(0.08)	(0.12)
Survey week (Ref. July 11–July 17)		
Week July 18–July 24	0.85	0.63***
	(0.08)	(0.05)
Week July 25–July 31	0.81*	0.66***
	(0.07)	(0.04)
Week August 1– August 7	0.94	0.50***
	(0.05)	(0.02)
Weeks August 8– August 21	1.34**	1.52***
	(0.15)	(0.14)
Survey type (Ref. Advertisement)		
Facebook page	1.77*	1.42
	(0.50)	(0.37)
Snowball	0.85	0.48***
	(0.10)	(0.05)
Observations	23897	

Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-sided tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Source: OneUA (2022)

Table A5. Logistic regression of the probability of intending to (1) leave Ukraine (reference category: remain in Ukraine), and (2) return to Ukraine (reference category: remain abroad), in odds ratio: stepwise inclusion of covariates, full models

	People in Ukraine: *Intend to leave Ukraine vs. remain in Ukraine*							Refugees abroad: *Intend to return to Ukraine vs. remain abroad*						
Support for negotiations	1.06***		1.02	1.01	1.01	1.04*		0.98		1.01	1.00	1.00	0.98*	
	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	
Support for a military solution		0.90***	0.91***	0.92***	0.92***		0.92***		1.05***	1.05***	1.05***	1.05***		1.05***
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)
Controls	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
Fixed effects for pre-war oblast of residence, survey week, and survey type	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	10501	10501	10501	10501	10501	10501	10501	12715	12715	12715	12715	12715	12715	12715

Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-sided tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for country of birth, being born in Crimea or Donbas, age, number of children, partnership status, multiple citizenship, educational attainment, relative financial situation in summer 2021, work in summer 2021, English language skills.

Source: OneUA (2022).

Table A6. Logistic regression of the probability of intending to (1) leave Ukraine (reference category: remain in Ukraine), and (2) return to Ukraine (reference category: remain abroad), in odds ratio: Full models.

	People in Ukraine: *Intend to leave Ukraine vs. remain in Ukraine*	Refugees abroad: *Intend to return to Ukraine vs. remain abroad*
	Model 2	**Model 3**
Support for negotiations	1.01	1.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Support for military solution	0.92***	1.05***
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Birth country (Ref. Ukraine)		
Russian Federation and Belarus	1.40	0.88
	(0.26)	(0.09)
Other countries	1.33	0.82
	(0.37)	(0.10)
Born in Crimea or Donbas	1.11	1.03
	(0.18)	(0.09)
Multiple citizenship	1.92	0.56**
	(0.78)	(0.10)
Age	1.06**	0.90***
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Age squared	1.00***	1.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Number of children	0.99	1.00
	(0.05)	(0.03)
Partnership status (Ref. No partner)		
Partner residing in Ukraine	0.72***	1.68***
	(0.06)	(0.08)
Partner outside of Ukraine	2.39***	0.90
	(0.54)	(0.05)
Education (Ref. Incomplete secondary or below)		
Full secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary	1.01	0.96
	(0.18)	(0.11)
Tertiary or higher	1.13	0.97
	(0.20)	(0.11)
Finances in summer 2021	1.09	1.11***
	(0.05)	(0.03)
With work experience	1.24*	0.92
	(0.12)	(0.04)
English language skills	1.25***	0.87***
	(0.05)	(0.02)

Pre-war oblast of residence (Ref. Kyiv)		
Cherkasy Oblast	0.67	0.76
	(0.27)	(0.13)
Chernihiv Oblast	0.70	0.92
	(0.22)	(0.14)
Chernivtsi Oblast	2.42**	1.14
	(0.81)	(0.26)
Autonomous Republic of Crimea	-	0.68
		(0.58)
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast	1.44*	0.77**
	(0.26)	(0.07)
Donetsk Oblast	0.96	0.58***
	(0.23)	(0.06)
Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast	2.24**	1.09
	(0.58)	(0.21)
Kharkiv Oblast	1.45*	0.82**
	(0.23)	(0.06)
Kherson Oblast	1.62*	1.19
	(0.33)	(0.16)
Khmelnytskyi Oblast	1.33	0.98
	(0.36)	(0.20)
Kyiv Oblast	0.91	0.87
	(0.15)	(0.07)
Kirovohrad Oblast	1.30	0.51***
	(0.39)	(0.10)
Lviv Oblast	0.88	0.97
	(0.24)	(0.13)
Luhansk Oblast	0.78	0.58**
	(0.30)	(0.12)
Mykolaiv Oblast	0.78	1.24
	(0.19)	(0.14)
Odesa Oblast	1.52*	1.09
	(0.30)	(0.10)
Poltava Oblast	1.38	0.81
	(0.36)	(0.11)
Rivne Oblast	1.48	0.95
	(0.45)	(0.17)
Sumy Oblast	0.75	1.11
	(0.22)	(0.17)
Ternopil Oblast	1.10	1.48
	(0.42)	(0.36)
Zakarpattia Oblast	1.77	0.82
	(0.53)	(0.17)

Vinnytsia Oblast	1.50	0.69*
	(0.37)	(0.10)
Volyn Oblast	1.43	1.16
	(0.42)	(0.25)
Zaporizhzhia Oblast	0.99	0.78*
	(0.21)	(0.08)
Zhytomyr Oblast	1.13	0.86
	(0.33)	(0.13)
Survey week (Ref. July 11–July 17)		
Week July 18–July 24	0.69*	0.98
	(0.12)	(0.08)
Week July 25–July 31	0.87	1.05
	(0.13)	(0.08)
Week August 1– August 7	0.76**	0.98
	(0.08)	(0.05)
Weeks August 8– August 21	0.67	0.95
	(0.15)	(0.07)
Survey type (Ref. Advertisement)		
Facebook page	1.11	1.24
	(0.58)	(0.34)
Snowball	1.26	0.86
	(0.22)	(0.10)
Observations	10501	12716

Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-sided tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Source: OneUA (2022).

Table A7. Multinomial regression of the probability of staying in pre-war places of residence (reference category), being an IDP, or a refugee, in odds ratio: Supplementary analyses and robustness checks

	IDP	*Refugee*
	...vs. stayer	
Preferences for conflict resolution regarding Donbass	**Model 1a**	
Support for negotiations	0.99	1.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Support for military solution	0.99	0.97***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	24756	
Preferences for conflict resolution regarding Crimea	**Model 1b**	
Support for negotiations	1.00	1.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)

Support for military solution	0.97**	0.96***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	24756	
Excluding refugees in Russia and Belarus	**Model 1c**	
Support for negotiations	0.99	1.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Support for military solution	0.97**	0.96***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	24753	
Excluding participants from snowball and page samples	**Model 1d**	
Support for negotiations	0.99	1.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Support for military solution	0.97**	0.95***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	23897	

Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-sided tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for country of birth, being born in Crimea or Donbas, age, number of children, partnership status, multiple citizenship, educational attainment, relative financial situation in summer 2021, work in summer 2021, English language skills, fixed effects for pre-war oblast of residence, survey week, and survey type (except Model 1d).

Source: OneUA (2022).

Table A8. Logistic regression of the probability of intending to (1) leave Ukraine (reference category: remain in Ukraine), and (2) return to Ukraine (reference category: remain abroad), in odds ratio: Supplementary analyses and robustness checks

	People in Ukraine: *Intend to leave Ukraine vs. remain in Ukraine*	Refugees abroad: *Intend to return to Ukraine vs. remain abroad*
Preferences for conflict resolution regarding Donbass	**Model 2a**	**Model 3a**
Support for negotiations	1.01	0.99
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Support for military solution	0.94***	1.06***
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Observations	10501	12716
Preferences for conflict resolution regarding Crimea	**Model 2b**	**Model 3b**
Support for negotiations	1.00	1.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Support for military solution	0.94***	1.02*
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Observations	10501	12716

Excluding refugees in Russia and Belarus	**Model 2c**	**Model 3c**
Support for negotiations	1.01	1.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Support for military solution	0.92***	1.05***
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Observations	10501	12713
Excluding participants from snowball and page samples	**Model 2d**	**Model 3d**
Support for negotiations	1.01	1.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Support for military solution	0.92***	1.05***
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Observations	10084	12326

Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (two-sided tests). Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models control for country of birth, being born in Crimea or Donbas, age, number of children, partnership status, multiple citizenship, educational attainment, relative financial situation in summer 2021, work in summer 2021, English language skills, fixed effects for pre-war oblast of residence, survey week, and survey type (except Models 2d and 3d).

Source: OneUA (2022).

Appendix B

Multicollinearity test

To assess multicollinearity in the imputed data, we used the Stata command *mivif* (Klein, 2011), which computes variance inflation factors (VIFs) for independent variables after mi estimate. The command applies Stata's standard *estat vif* procedure to each imputed dataset and reports the mean VIF across all M (=20) imputations.

Since *mivif* is designed for linear models, we replicated our nonlinear models as linear probability models. For the multinomial regression, we estimated two separate linear models: one comparing IDPs to stayers and another comparing refugees to stayers. The results for our key independent variables remained qualitatively consistent with those from the main analyses.

In terms of multicollinearity, the mean VIFs indicate no serious issues:

- **Model 1** (IDPs vs. stayers): 3.31
- **Model 1** (refugees vs. stayers): 3.29
- **Model 2** (migration intentions): 3.33
- **Model 3** (return intentions): 3.29