The Strategies of Inter-Ethnic Adaptation of Estonian Russians

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Abstract

Based on the inter-cultural relations model of John Berry, four different groups among Russian-speakers in Estonia were differentiated in the analysis of 'Integration monitoring 2005'. The analysis reveals that both similarities and differences exist between the characteristics of these four groups and the groups in the typology of Berry (integration, assimilation, marginalisation, separation). The differences that emerged are related to the assimilation and integration strategies, which proved to be rather restrained for Russian-speakers in the current social and political context in Estonia. The analysis gives us ground to claim that the strong ethnic connotation of the current nation-state model in Estonia hinders finding a positive place in this country even for those Russian-speakers, who, in fact, would like to integrate.

Keywords: Inter-cultural relations, acculturation strategies, integration policy, Estonia, Russian-speakers.

Introduction

The aim of this article is twofold. Empirically, the objective is to study the strategies of adaptation among Estonian Russians, particularly their attitudes towards a number of inter-ethnic issues in Estonia. Theoretically, the goal is to contribute to the discussion on the possible range of adaptation strategies utilised by immigrants and ethnic minorities. The conceptual idea behind the article holds that the original classification of John Berry, based on the research of acculturation and inter-cultural strategies (Berry 2008), reflects more universal strategies of inter-ethnic adaptation. We presume that utilising the ideal types presented in the model is helpful for better understanding of the strategies of inter-ethnic adaptation in this country.

To test the presumption, we used the data of the study 'Integration monitoring 2005', which includes variables related to the acculturation framework of Berry on the one hand, and a number of additional variables related to the inter-ethnic issue in Estonia, like perceived discrimination, economic and political satisfaction, etc., on the other. We first constructed a five-factor model in order to reduce and generalise the chosen variables. On the basis of the obtained factor scores, cluster analysis was carried out, in order to distinguish four groups of Russian-speaking respondents, as is done in Berry's model. The four groups obtained were analysed using five-factor scores, several other adaptation variables, as well as demographic background characteristics. Finally, the characteristics of the four groups were compared to the characteristics of the groups in Berry's model, in order to determine the similarities and differences.

The article is divided into three sections. The first section outlines the main factors of the social and political context that have an impact on the adaptation of Estonian Russians. The second section presents an overview of the theoretical approaches to inter-group adaptation. The last section is devoted to the analysis of the data of 'Integration Monitoring 2005' and the interpretation of the results of the analyses along the inter-cultural relations model of Berry.

The adaptation context in Estonia

The adaptation context of Estonian Russians is characterised by a very specific social and political context, shaped both by the Soviet policies and the policies adopted since the regaining of independence in 1991. Before the Soviet occupation of 1940, according to the census of 1934, Estonians comprised 88%, Russians eight per cent and other nationalities four per cent of the population of Estonia. Russians in Estonia lived mainly in the border regions of Narva, Peipsi and Petseri. In 1945, the Soviet authorities changed the border between Estonia and the Russian Federation. As a result, Estonia lost the border

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regions inhabited by native Russians, which left Estonia a very homogeneous country where ethnic Estonians formed 97.3% of the population. However, in the period of 1945-1989 the population of Russian speakers in Estonia grew from 26,000 to 602,000, increasing from 2.7% to 39% (Vetik 1993). Such a dramatic demographic change is the result of the policies of the Soviet Union after WWII, which aimed to reconstruct Estonia both economically and socially as an integral part of the Soviet Union (Mettam & Williams 2001).

In this context, the Soviet policies and institutions strongly supported the structural adaptation of Russian immigrants in Estonia. For example, a number of economic spheres and political institutions operated only in Russian, the migrants working mostly at all-Union enterprises had privileges in obtaining housing, and a separate Russian language education system was established in Estonia. As the result of such policies, the comparatively smooth structural adaptation of Russians in Estonia was accompanied by high segmentation between the Estonian language and Russian language communities. The Russian language migrants remained apart from the Estonian community culturally as well, representing the category of the so-called 'Soviet people' with no urgent need to learn the Estonian language or engage in interaction with local people. A very low level of interaction is one of the main features of the inter- ethnic adaptation context also in current Estonia - the extra vocational interaction networks in particular are centred without exception around one's own ethnicity (Korts & Vihalemm 2008).

Since 1991, a number of new institutions aiming to continue the nation building processes along the lines of the pre-Soviet period were established. For example, the citizenship law that aims at legal continuity with the Estonian Republic of 1918-1940 was adopted by the Estonian Parliament in 1992. The law was exclusive in the sense that it defined only those residents and their descendants as citizens who were citizens of Estonia before Soviet occupation (including those of Russian ethnicity who were Estonian citizens before the Soviet occupation). People who migrated to Estonia during the Soviet era had to go through the naturalisation process. The law required two years of residence before a person was entitled to apply for citizenship, and an additional one year waiting period before the applicant could be naturalised. The law also included a loyalty oath and restricted certain categories of people from gaining citizenship (military officers, foreign intelligence, *etc.*). In addition, the law required knowledge of the Estonian language. Since a large proportion of the Russian speaking population neither had proficiency in the Estonian language when the citizenship law was passed, nor learned it later for various reasons, they either remained without citizenship or acquired Russian citizenship. By 2008, only about a half of Russian-speakers had acquired Estonian citizenship, and about the same proportion were either non-citizens or citizens of Russia (Nimmerfeldt 2008).

The principle of legal continuity, as such, is merely a legal notion, but the psychological, social and political consequences of its implementation have proven to carry a very strong ethnic connotation. For example, previous research indicates that the emotional attachment of Russian-speakers to Estonia is related mainly to personal matters like family and home, which are located here, but not to the factors of the public sphere, like citizenship or state symbols (Vetik & Nimmerfeldt 2008). Thus, one of the negative results of the citizenship controversy is that the Estonian citizenship status is for Russian-speakers more of a pragmatic choice and a sort of social investment, rather than the measure of a person's civic identity (Lauristin 2008). Furthermore, since this legal model became the basis of many new social and political institutions that strongly influence the adaptation of Estonian Russians, it gave rise to an emergence of ethnically based status hierarchies. Such hierarchies are particularly strong in the political sphere, since non-citizens are denied the right to run for public office, form political parties, and vote in national elections.

Besides the citizenship issue, Estonia's language and educational reforms have also contributed to the formation of a specific inter-ethnic adaptation context in Estonia, perceived by Estonian Russians as attempts at the ethnicisation of the public sphere. According to the Language Laws of 1989 and 1995, the Estonian language is the only official state language in Estonia. Due to the political context in which these laws were adopted, many Estonian Russians regard the issuing of special rights given to the Estonian language as a limitation of their own rights. In addition, in many areas of Estonia that are mostly inhabited by the Russian speaking population, acquisition of the Estonian language at a sufficient level remains unrealistic, as many people lack the vital need for it, and this dominant Russian language context is not conducive to sustaining knowledge of the Estonian language. As a result, many Russian-speakers consider Estonia's language policy as a form of forced acculturation or a vehicle for exclusion, aiming to create a unitary nation-state in Estonia.

The same pattern is repeated regarding the educational reform, which started already in the beginning of the 1990s, but is still ongoing. According to the law of 2005, the language of instruction

in the Russian schools will be both Russian and Estonian. After several postponements, the transition to Estonian as one of the languages of instruction in upper secondary schools started in the academic year of 2007. The aim of the reform is that after a five year transition period, 60 % of all instruction in Russian upper secondary schools will be carried out in Estonian. The reform should help the Russian youth to achieve an equal starting position in the labour market compared to the Estonian youth, but in the political context of Estonia, many Russians perceive the reform as another attempt at forced acculturation. Thus, the school reform is not viewed in a constructive perspective and many Estonian Russians have a negative attitude towards it *a priori* (Saar 2008).

Thus, the inter-ethnic issue is strongly politicised in Estonia. A major external factor contributing to it is the permanent inter-state tension between Estonia and Russia during the last two decades (Vetik 2009). It is important to note, in this context, that the two communities in Estonia are fundamentally divided by their attitudes towards the tensions. For many Estonians, Russia does not only embody the injustice of the past, but is also a continuous security threat. So the perceived imperialist ambitions of Russia are viewed as a source of the inter-ethnic tension by many Estonians. For most Estonian Russians, however, Russia is not only a source of their traditions and culture, but also the source of information through which meaning is given to their current everyday life (Vihalemm 2008). This split has sadly become an essential feature of Estonian party politics, as it is used for electoral gain, which further amplifies the divergence between the two communities (Vetik 2008).

Briefly, due to both the legacy of the Soviet period and the way chosen by the Estonian state to overcome it, a very specific context for the adaptation of Estonian Russians has formed. The policies of the Estonian state, based on the ethnically connoted nation-state model (Piirimäe 2007), are perceived by many Russians as signalling 'you are strangers and do not belong here'. Any protests against such policies are labelled by Estonians as anti-Estonian and representing the imperialist ambitions of Russia (Vetik 2009). In this context, the political mobilisation and participation of Estonian Russians has remained rather modest (Hallik 2005).

Theoretical framework

The concept of *intercultural strategies* was introduced by Berry (1997, 2008) as an extension of the earlier concept of acculturation strategies (Berry 1980). This concept refers to the various ways that groups and individuals seek to acculturate and relate to each other as they carry out their lives when living in a society with two or more cultures. Knowledge of these variations has increased substantially in recent years (see Berry 2003, 2005), challenging the assumption that everyone would eventually assimilate and become absorbed into the dominant group (Gordon 1964). The notion of *strategy* is based on the view that at the cultural level the two groups in contact (whether dominant or non-dominant) usually have some notions about what they are attempting to do (*e.g.* colonial policies). At the individual level, people will vary within their cultural group or ethnocultural community (*e.g.* on the basis of their educational or occupational background). The more immediate outcomes of the acculturation process (including the behavioural changes and acculturative stress phenomena) are known to be a function, at least to some extent, of what people try to do during their acculturation; and the longer term outcomes (both psychological and sociocultural adaptations) often correspond to the strategic goals set by the groups of which they are members (Berry 1997, 2005).

Four strategies have been derived from two basic issues facing all peoples living interculturally. These issues are based on the distinction between orientations towards one's own group, and those towards other groups (Berry 1980). This distinction is rendered as (i) a relative preference for maintaining one's heritage culture and identity, and (ii) a relative preference for having contact with and participating in the larger society along with other ethnocultural groups. It has now been well demonstrated that these two dimensions are empirically, as well as conceptually, independent from each other (Ryder *et al*. 2000). This two dimensional formulation is presented in Figure 1.

These two issues can be responded to on attitudinal dimensions, shown as varying along bipolar dimensions, rather than merely as bald alternatives. Orientations to these issues intersect to define four acculturation strategies. These strategies carry different names, depending on which group (the dominant or non-dominant) is being considered. From the point of view of non-dominant ethnocultural groups (on the left of Figure 1), when individuals do not wish to maintain their cultural identity and seek daily interaction with other cultures, the Assimilation strategy is defined. In contrast, when individuals place value on holding on to their original culture and at the same time wish to avoid interaction with others, then the Separation alternative is defined. When there is an interest in both

maintaining one's original culture, while in daily interactions with other groups, Integration is the option. In this case, there is some degree of cultural integrity maintained, while at the same time seeking, as a member of an ethnocultural group, to participate as an integral part of the evolving larger social network. Finally, when there is little possibility or interest in cultural maintenance (often for reasons of enforced cultural loss), and little interest in having relations with others (often for reasons of exclusion or discrimination) then Marginalisation is defined.

Figure 1. Intercultural Strategies in Ethnocultural Groups and the Larger Society.

ISSUE 1:

MAINTENACE OF HERITAGE CULTURE AND IDENTITY

ISSUE 2:

RELATIONSHIPS SOUGHT AMONG GROUPS

INTEGRATION   ASSIMILATION

SEPARATION   MARGINALISATION

MULTICULTURALISM   MELTING POT

SEGREGATION   EXCLUSION

STRATEGIES OF ETHNOCULTURAL GROUPS

STRATEGIES OF LARGER SOCIETY

It is obvious that non-dominant groups and their individual members do not have the freedom to choose how they want to acculturate or relate to other groups. When the dominant group enforces certain forms of acculturation or constrains the choices of non-dominant groups or individuals, then other terms need to be used. Thus, Integration can only be 'freely' chosen and successfully pursued by non-dominant groups when the dominant society is open and inclusive in its orientation towards cultural diversity. Thus, mutual accommodation is required for Integration to be attained, involving the acceptance by both groups of the right of all groups to live as culturally different peoples. This strategy requires non-dominant groups to adopt the basic values of the larger society, while at the same time the dominant group must be prepared to adapt national institutions (*e.g.* education, health, labour) to better meet the needs of all groups now living together in the plural society (Berry 1974). As Estonia is part of the EU, it is important to notice that this meaning of the concept of integration was largely accepted by the EU (2005) in their set of 'Common Basic Principles' for integration in Europe.

These two basic issues were initially approached from the point of view of the non-dominant ethnocultural groups. However, since the original anthropological definition clearly established that both groups in contact would change and become acculturated, a third dimension was added: that of the powerful role played by the dominant group in influencing the way in which mutual acculturation would take place (Berry 1974). The addition of this third dimension produces the right side of Figure 1. When sought by the dominant group, Assimilation is termed the Melting Pot. When Separation is forced by the dominant group, it is called Segregation. Marginalisation, when imposed by the dominant group, is Exclusion. Finally for Integration, when diversity is a widely accepted feature of the society as a whole, including by all the various ethnocultural groups, it is called Multiculturalism.

With the use of this framework, comparisons can be made between individuals and their groups, and between non-dominant peoples and the larger society within which they are acculturating. The

acculturation ideologies and policies of the dominant group constitute an important element of intercultural research (see Berry, *et al*. 1977, Bourhis *et al*. 1997), while understanding the preferences of non-dominant peoples are a core feature in acculturation research, (Berry 2006, Berry *et al*. 1989). Inconsistencies and conflicts between these various acculturation preferences are common sources of difficulty for those experiencing acculturation. For example, this can occur when individuals do not accept the main ideology of their society (when individuals oppose immigrant cultural maintenance in a society where multiculturalism is official national policy), or when immigrant children challenge the way of acculturating set out by their parents. Generally, when acculturation experiences cause problems for acculturating individuals, we observe the phenomenon of acculturative stress, with variations in levels of adaptation (Berry 2005).

Data and methods

The following analysis is based on a survey carried out in Estonia in 2005 - 'Integration monitoring 2005', which was elaborated by the Tallinn University Institute of International and Social Studies (IISS) research group and carried out by the research company Saar Poll. This research was commissioned by the Integration Foundation of Estonia and such monitoring has been carried out regularly since 2000. The goal of integration monitoring is to obtain a general overview about the accomplishment of the aims formulated in official integration documents along three strategic spheres: language-communicative, legal-political and socio-economic. Academic interests have also been taken into account in developing the monitoring instrument.

1,000 individuals aged from 15 to 75 were interviewed for the 'Integration monitoring 2005', the sample being representative of Estonia's population structure, including 659 Estonians as well as 341 Russian speaking inhabitants of other nationalities (currently Russian-speakers form 32% of the population). The survey was carried out in the period January 20 – February 1, 2005, by the Saar Poll company. For defining the socio-demographic model for the sample, the data from the population register as of 01.01.2003 was used. Weighting of the sample along the variables of place of living, gender, age, nationality, region and education was carried out.

The Estonian Russian-speakers data from the survey is examined in the current paper. Among the data analysis methods used were factor analysis (extraction method: Principal Component Analysis, rotation method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation), formation of summarised items with controlling for reliability through Cronbach's *alpha*, cluster analysis K-means method for obtaining a determined amount of clusters, and dispersion analysis for discovering significant differences between the mean values of the factor characteristics.

From the 'Integration monitoring 2005' questionnaire, 36 items on interethnic relations were selected, answered by the Estonian Russian respondents. Among the selected questions were those related to the acculturation model of John Berry on the one hand, and a number of additional variables related to the inter-ethnic issue in Estonia like discrimination, economic and political satisfaction, etc., on the other (see Appendix 1). An additional criterion for selection was the demand for the dispersion of respective responses to be of sufficient scale for subsequent analysis. These variables were reduced and generalised using factor analysis. Based on the factor analysis results, a number of summarised items were formed, whereas only the items with bigger factor loadings where chosen from each factor. For most of the summarised items, the Cronbach´s *alpha* was higher than 0.6. All the summarised items were standardised and the missing values were substituted using the linear interpolation method.

As a result of the factor analysis, the following summarised items were obtained (see Appendix 1): Inequality of economical possibilities (scale 1), Inequality of career possibilities (2), Satisfaction with the economical situation (3), The position of Russians in Estonian society (4), Threat to Russian language and culture (5), Frustration from the lack of knowledge of the Russian language by Estonians (6), Contact with majority group (7), Ethnic self-esteem (8), Interest in Estonian Politics (9), Importance of political activity (10), Evaluation of the integration policy (11), Satisfaction with the governing of the state (12)[1].

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1 The list of summarised items is presented in Appendix 1. The subheadings in the table describe the main theme of the summarised items (scales), each of the numbered and underlined sentences is the name of separate summarised item under which separate questions (with order of answers) forming the item are given.

Table 1. Factor Analysis, Rotated Component Matrix

Scale	Factor 1 Contact and discrimination	Factor 2 Satisfaction with policies	Factor 3 Meaningfulness of civic engagement	Factor 4 Cultural Threat	Factor 5 Ethnic self-esteem	Communalities
1	**0.731**					0.622
2	**0.633**				-0.331	0.584
3		**0.725**				0.570
4	-0.406	**0.559**				0.525
5		0.305	0.318	**0.607**		0.675
6				**0.803**		0.743
7	**0.732**					0.557
8					**0.893**	0.820
9			**0.834**			0.756
10			**0.801**			0.708
11	-0.339	**0.707**				0.667
12		**0.488**		-0.430		0.489

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation

In order to further reduce the number of factors, the second order factor analysis of the summarised items was carried out (see Table 1). The best fit was found in the five-factor model, which described 64% of the variance (see Appendix 2). Based on the factor loadings that were obtained from the second factor analysis, we named the factor scores accordingly:

Factor 1: Contact and discrimination (Inequality of economical possibilities, Inequality of career possibilities, Contact with majority group).
Factor 2: Satisfaction with policies (Satisfaction with the economical situation, The position of Russians in Estonian society, Evaluation of the integration policy, Satisfaction with the governing of the state).
Factor 3: Meaningfulness of civic engagement (Interest in Estonian politics, Importance of political activity).
Factor 4: Cultural threat (Threat to Russian language and culture, Frustration from the lack of knowledge of the Russian language by the Estonians).
Factor 5: Ethnic self-esteem (Ethnic self-esteem).

Table 2. Cluster Analysis, Based on Five Factors

Factor scores	Group I	Group II	Group III	Group IV
Contact and discrimination	-0.49***	-0.93***	0.64**	0.54**
Satisfaction with policies	1.15***	-0.52**	-0.17***	-0.43**
Meaningfulness of civic engagement	-0.03***	-0.33***	0.82***	-0.78***
Cultural threat	-0.57**	0.65***	0.25***	-0.43**
Ethnic self-esteem	0.27*	0.08*	0.34*	-0.84***
Number of Cases	79	77	108	76
Percentage	23	23	32	22

* The asterisks show the number of groups that the given group significantly differs from when comparing their means (p<0,05)

On the basis of the obtained factor scores, cluster analysis was carried out using the K-Means method. Since one goal of the article is to compare the characteristics of the groups acquired in the current analysis to the typical characteristics of the groups in the model of Berry, we formed four clusters to characterise respondent groups with different dispositions on the five factors (see results in Table 2).

Characteristics of the four groups

The first group constitutes a little less than a quarter of the sample (23%) and is best adapted to the Estonian society on the individual as well as group level, compared to the other groups. This group demonstrates the lowest mean in cultural threat[2] and highest satisfaction with policies, as well as a lower than average perceived discrimination and higher than average ethnic self-esteem. Demographically, this group includes more men than on average, more younger people, more people with higher education, a smaller amount of retired and unemployed people, more people born in Estonia (71%), and more bearers of Estonian citizenship (73%) (see Appendix 3). Almost half of the group lives in the regions of Estonia that are mostly populated by Estonians (47%). Other items from the questionnaire that reflect adaptation (skills in the Estonian language, considering Estonia as one's homeland, *etc.*; see Table 3) demonstrated high values in this group as well. Representatives of this group considered themselves to be more European, compared to other groups, thus, identifying themselves with an European orientation which is widespread among Estonians. It can be claimed that living in areas mostly inhabited by Estonians has enhanced contacts of this group with Estonians, as well as their acquisition of the Estonian language and culture. Since they are younger and better educated, this has also contributed to their better opportunities in acquiring the Estonian language and citizenship.

Table 3. Additional adaptation indicators

|	Integration	Diffuse profile	Separation	Marginalisation
Thinks that Estonia joined the Soviet Union voluntarily in 1940, %	53	40	69	58
Able to communicate in Estonian well or at the medium level, %	68	43	36	21
Considers only Estonia as homeland, %	65	57	32	40
Considers oneself a European, %	75	66	55	46
Is interested in almost anything that goes on in Russia, %	38	39	62	24
Is willing to participate with Estonians in a leisure club/society , %	78	74	66	41
Agrees that it is important to actively take part in society life and give one's input, %	60	47	57	32
Wishes to be a bearer of ethnicity and culture, %	50	60	82	51

The respondents of the second group also comprise 23% of the sample and are characterised by a relatively successful adaptation to the Estonian society as well: they demonstrate the lowest fear towards contacts with Estonians, as well as the lowest perceived discrimination, which in our context refers primarily to good individual socio-economic adaptation. At the same time, they are characterised by a higher perceived cultural threat and lowest satisfaction with government policies, which refers to adaptation problems and dissatisfaction on the group level. In addition, this group is defined by a low

2 In the following text the word 'mean' is not continuously repeated, but it is important to keep in mind that the presented indicators are not absolute, but relative.

ethnic self-esteem and perceived meaningfulness of civic engagement. Regarding other adaptation indicators (Table 3), the group is characterised by higher Estonian patriotism (the lowest percentage who think Estonia joined Soviet Union voluntarily in 1940) and a stronger willingness to spend leisure time with Estonians (they are inclined to being members of leisure clubs/societies with Estonians). Demographically, this group includes more people in their early middle age, most of whom are born in Estonia (59%) and live in Tallinn (44%). These are people who regard Estonia as their homeland, but many of them have not acquired Estonian citizenship. Among them there are more people who are fluent in the Estonian language (43%) than those who are Estonian citizens (38%); this discrepancy can be regarded as a kind of protest against the particular nation-state model. One of the reasons for their low satisfaction with government policies is the fact that almost half of this group are stateless (43%).

The third group is the largest one, constituting about a third of the sample (32%). This group is characterised by the highest dissatisfaction with their condition (the highest perceived discrimination as well as a fear of contacts with Estonians and a relatively high level of cultural threat), which refers to difficulties in adaptation on the individual and group level. At the same time, this group is defined by high ethnic self-esteem and psychological orientation towards Russia (many are interested in almost everything that is going on in Russia; few regard Estonia as their only homeland, and most think that Estonia joined the Soviet Union voluntarily in 1940), which have been channelled into a stronger orientation towards political activity. Demographically, this group contains older people, mostly with secondary education (70%), mostly born outside Estonia (59%), less than half are Estonian citizens (46%), and the majority of them live in Tallinn (56%). Thus, in this group are mostly the older people [non-Estonians] who were born outside of Estonia, who acquired a secondary education during the Soviet time, and do not regard Estonia as their homeland. The majority live in Tallinn, where Russian minded political attitudes as well as higher political activity ('*Interfront*' in the beginning of 1990s, '*Nochnoi Dozor*' currently) are more widespread among residents.

Figure 2. Scores of Four Intercultural Strategy Groups on Five Factors

The fourth group comprises about one fifth of the sample (22%) and is remarkable for their lowest adaptation indicators on an individual, as well as group level: the lowest ethnic self-esteem and meaningfulness of civic engagement, very high perceived discrimination and fear of contacts with Estonians, as well as very low satisfaction with government policies. Demographically, this group includes more women than on average, older people, a greater amount of retired and unemployed people, more people with lower education (a third with just basic education), mostly born outside

Estonia (61%), mostly holders of Russian citizenship or stateless people, and almost half living in the Russian border region of Ida-Virumaa (47%). Therefore, in this group there are people who are older and have lower education, who were born outside of Estonia and live in areas that offer fewer opportunities for contact with Estonians, which is why they mostly have no Estonian language skills or the skills are insufficient. As a result, they can not acquire Estonian citizenship, which together with the low education level weakens their opportunities for finding employment and for structural integration to the Estonian society, enhancing social passivity and marginalisation.

If we compare the groups that have adapted better (first and second), then we will find the highest mean differences in cultural threat and satisfaction with policies (see Figure 2). Based on this, we can presume that cultural threat has a significant influence on political satisfaction: in the first group the lower cultural threat is connected to higher political satisfaction and in the second group a high cultural threat is related to lower political satisfaction. The groups that have adapted less successfully (third and fourth) differ along three factor scores (meaningfulness of civic engagement, cultural threat, and ethnic self-esteem, see Figure 2). It can be presumed that in case of the third group, higher ethnic self-esteem that is accompanied by a higher sense of cultural threat applies more meaning to civic engagement, since they regard political actions to be more necessary than other groups do. Also, in this group there are considerably more people with Estonian citizenship, in contrast to the second or fourth groups, which partly explains their higher political activity, as compared to other groups. Their relatively higher orientation towards political activity is probably supported also by their higher orientation towards Russia (62% are interested in almost everything that goes on in Russia).

Discussion

The characteristics of the four groups described in the previous section overlap to a large extent with what the intercultural strategies model suggests. On this basis, three out of the four described groups can be named along the model as follows: the first group can be regarded as mainly representing integration (with certain assimilation connotation), the third as separation and the fourth as marginalisation strategies of the model. The second group described above can be defined as having a diffuse profile (see also Berry *et al.* 2006), in which some characteristics suggest an integration orientation (attitudes towards contact), some suggest a separation orientation (low meaningfulness of civic engagement, citizenship behaviour), and some are reactions to forced acculturation practices of the state (high perceived cultural threat).

The most characteristic factor score means that describe these four groups are shown in Figure 3. The intercultural relations model that the figure is based on holds that assimilation and integration groups are interested in contact with and participation in the larger society (the left side dimension of Figure 1), while separation and marginalisation groups are not interested in such relationships. Our data reveals that, in accordance with the framework, perceived discrimination and fear of contacts with Estonians are lower in the integration and diffuse groups than in the separation and marginalisation groups. Therefore, we suggest that in our analysis the contact and discrimination factor can be regarded as the key indicator of the orientation towards participation in the broader society. This central role for discrimination in distinguishing intercultural strategies has been found frequently in research with immigrants. For example, in the study of immigrant youth (Berry et al. 2006), discrimination was the single most powerful factor in distinguishing the integration and assimilation groups from the separation and marginalisation groups. In previous research in Estonia as well, discrimination has been found to distinguish between well and less well adapted groups of Estonian Russians (Kruusvall 2002).

Our analysis also indicates that *integration* and *diffuse* groups differ from *separation* and *marginalisation* groups in terms of the quantity of contacts. The same pattern is confirmed by the analyses of other adaptation indicators, which reveal for example, that there is a difference in the willingness of these four groups to participate in leisure time activities with Estonians (78% and 74% versus 66% and 41% - see Figure 4). Thus, one can suppose that contacts with Estonians create preconditions for the achievement of a more equitable economic and social status for Estonian Russians, which decreases their perception of discrimination. The importance of contacts with members of the larger society has also been found in research on immigrants. For example, in the immigrant youth study (Berry *et al.* 2006) peer contacts with members of the larger society were higher for those in the integration and assimilation groups than for those in the separation and marginalisation groups.

Figure 3. Placement of Four Groups and Five Factors on the Two Dimensions of the Intercultural Strategies Framework

		MAINTENANCE OF CULTURE AND IDENTITY	
		+	−
RELATIONSHIPS SOUGHT WITH ESTONIANS	+	- **contact and discrimination** - meaningfulness of civic engagement cultural threat + political satisfaction – *DIFFUSE PROFILE*	- **contact and discrimination** + political satisfaction cultural threat - *INTEGRATION (WITH ASSIMILATION CONNOTATION)*
	−	+ **contact and discrimination** + meaningfulness of civic engagement cultural threat + *SEPARATION*	+ **contact and discrimination** - political satisfaction - ethnic self-esteem cultural threat - meaningfulness of civic engagement – *MARGINALISATION*

The intercultural framework also presumes that integration and separation groups are interested in maintaining their ethnic heritage cultures and identities (the upper dimension of Figure 1), while assimilation and marginalisation groups are not interested in preserving their ethnic cultures. We suggest that in our analyses, the cultural threat factor can be regarded as the key indicator of the wish to preserve one's ethnic culture. Our data reveals that cultural threat is higher in the diffuse and separation groups as compared to integration and marginalisation groups. The seemingly contradictory fact that cultural threat is low in the case of integration group refers to the assimilation connotation in their profile and can be explained by the social structure of this group – they tend to be younger, better educated, born in Estonia, have Estonian citizenship, etc., which all contribute to their better psychological adaptation compared to the other three groups. The same pattern is confirmed by the analysis of other adaptation indicators, which reveal that separation and diffuse groups are more willing to be bearers of their ethnicity and culture, compared to the integration and marginalisation groups (82% and 60% versus 50% and 51% - see Figure 4). This finding is consistent with the broad literature on the multiculturalism hypothesis (see Berry 2006 for a description). This hypothesis is that when a person is secure in their cultural identity, they will be open to engaging with those who are culturally different from themselves. However, when individuals feel threatened by others, they will react negatively to this threat and move toward an enhanced ethnic identity.

Data in Figure 5 confirms the trends presented in Figure 3 through the analysis of the two initial items in the research instrument that are directly related to the dimensions distinguished in the intercultural framework. Most (94%) representatives of the diffuse group are disturbed by the lack of knowledge of the Russian language among Estonians (including 33% who are very disturbed), which indicates high maintenance of one's own culture and identity and, therefore, also a cultural threat. In the integration group, on the other hand, only 40% are disturbed by the lack of knowledge of the Russian language among Estonians, which indicates a low cultural threat. At the same time, both groups are inclined to go to work or study in a collective where the majority is Estonian; hence, they are characterised by a high willingness for contact with the majority group (and they do not perceive problems or discrimination in these contacts). In the separation and marginalisation groups, on the other hand, the proportion of those who are ready to go to work or study in a collective where the majority is Estonian is only 59% and 41% respectively, which is in accordance with the framework.

Figure 4. Placement of Four Groups, and Two Questions on the Two Dimensions of the Intercultural Strategies Framework

		MAINTENANCE OF CULTURE AND IDENTITY	
		+	-
RELATIONSHIPS SOUGHT WITH ESTONIANS	+	+ Is willing to participate in leisure time activity with Estonians (74%) + Wishes to be a bearer of ethnicity and culture (60%) *DIFFUSE PROFILE*	+ Is willing to participate in leisure time activity with Estonians (78%) - Wishes to be a bearer of ethnicity and culture (50%) *INTEGRATION (WITH ASSIMILATION CONNOTATION)*
	-	- Is willing to participate in leisure time activity with Estonians (66%) + Wishes to be a bearer of ethnicity and culture (82%) *SEPARATION*	- Is willing to participate in leisure time activity with Estonians (41%) - Wishes to be a bearer of ethnicity and culture (51%) *MARGINALISATION*

For comparison, the figure also offers data on the Estonian respondents' answers. Most Estonians are disturbed by the lack of knowledge of the Estonian language among Estonian Russians and only 56% of them are ready to go to work or study in a collective where the majority is Russian. The Russian language skills of Estonians themselves have decreased rapidly in recent decades and this is mostly true for the youth. For example, according to the 'Integration monitoring 2005', the proportion of youth that was able to interact in Russian had diminished from 44% in 1997 to 24% in 2005 in the 15-19 age group, and in the 20-29 group respectively from 75% in 1997 to 54% in 2005 (Kruusvall 2006).

Comparing the additional adaptation indicators of the integration and marginalisation groups we see that the biggest difference lies in their Estonian language skills (able to communicate in Estonian: integration – 68%, marginalisation – 21%). Diffuse and separation groups mostly differ in their historical-political views on the relationship between Estonia and Russia (Thinks that Estonia joined the Soviet Union voluntarily in 1940: separation – 69%, integration – 40%).

Thus, one can argue that besides remarkable similarities there are also several important differences between what the intercultural relations model predicts and what can be found in the Estonian data. The first difference is that in Estonia we did not find a clear-cut assimilation category among Russian-speakers. This is not surprising at all and can be explained by historical and geographical factors (Estonian Russians used to be a dominating group during the Soviet period, Russia is a large and powerful neighbouring country to Estonia actively seeking to engage Estonian Russians) on the one hand, as well as by the high level of ethnic closure of the Estonian ethnic community (strong ethnic connotation of the nation-state model) on the other. However, the profiles of the integration and diffuse groups include certain characteristics of the assimilation category (low cultural threat, perceived discrimination).

Figure 5. Distribution of Responses to Two Questions by Four Groups.

* Regarding the Estonians 'knowledge of Estonian language' and 'majority is Russian' was inquired.

There are certain differences between the model and reality also regarding the integration group, which represents 23% of the sample. This group is characterised by comparatively good adaptation as reflected in its lowest mean in cultural threat, highest satisfaction with policies, a lower than average perceived discrimination, higher than average ethnic self-esteem, higher rate of Estonian citizens, *etc*. However, contrary to what the model predicts, this group is not oriented towards participation in the larger society, as it does not regard civic engagement to be meaningful. One can argue that since the concept of integration entails a specific meaning for Estonian Russians, following this strategy is also rather problematic for them (similarly to the assimilation strategy), where civic engagement may be considered as a route to assimilation, rather than as an opportunity for advancement. The problem is that in the context of the specific nation-state concept in Estonia, as well as the regular tensions between Estonia and Russia which fuel the ethnic connotation of the concept, the representation of the specific political interests of Estonian Russians and the advancement of Russian culture are regarded rather suspiciously by the larger society (Rebane 2009). However, as this group is psychologically oriented towards Estonia and not Russia, then their interest in Estonian politics, as well as their desire to participate in it is not significant.

The latter situation also holds regarding the diffuse group, which is characterised by the lowest fear towards the contacts with Estonians and lowest perceived discrimination, but also by the highest perceived cultural threat and the lowest satisfaction with policies. This group represents 23% of the Russian Estonians in the whole sample, and they may be seen as potential integrationists, because a number of their adaptation characteristics are close to the latter group and differ strongly from those of the separation and marginalisation groups (views on the contested history of Estonia, on Russia, Europe, *etc*.). Thus, one can argue that the Estonian Russians in the diffuse group who indicate their loyalty to the Estonian state in the survey lack such outlets for representing their specific cultural and political interests that are considered legitimate in the larger society. This discrepancy is channelled into very low level of meaningfulness of civic participation, considerably higher discontent with government policies compared to other groups, as well as into a kind of quiet protest in the form of not acquiring the Estonian citizenship (only 38% of them are Estonian citizens).

The attitudes described for the separation (32%) and marginalisation (22%) groups resemble what has been found previously in research with the intercultural framework. The marginalisation group is lowest in ethnic self-esteem and very low in perceiving cultural threat, satisfaction with policies and meaningfulness of civic engagement. The separation group has the strongest ethnic self-esteem and wish to preserve one's ethnic uniqueness; they are also critical towards the policies of the Estonian state, which in their account is exclusionist. The combination of high ethnic self-esteem and a critical

attitude towards the Estonian policies is channelled into psychological orientation towards Russia as well as political mobilisation: this group is more ready for political action to reach their goals. Thus, if the other three groups do not see a 'window of opportunity' to participate in the Estonian public sphere in a constructive manner, which would be perceived as legitimate by the larger society, the separation group is willing to take the risk and be labelled as 'anti-Estonian'.

Conclusions

The main conclusion of this study is that serious obstacles exist for the adaptation of Estonian Russians along both dimensions of the inter-cultural relations model – maintaining one's cultural heritage and participation in the larger society. As a result of the high threat perception of Russia among Estonians, as well as the ethnic connotation of the nation-state model, the activity of Estonian Russians to formulate and achieve their own specific political and cultural goals (representation in the parliament, activities related to human rights, the issues of Russian language and education, etc.) have acquired the reputation of actions that are hostile towards the Estonian state. As a result, the option of integration, in the meaning of the inter-cultural framework, is restricted only to the socio-economic sphere for Estonian Russians. In this sphere, achieving success is primarily dependent on the individuals themselves, since the ethnic factor does not pose a particular problem in the Estonian economy. However, the integration of Estonian Russians in the political or cultural spheres, in which successful adaptation depends to a large extent also on the attitudes of the larger community, is highly problematic. This is the reason why even the term 'integration' has a negative connotation among Estonian Russians (there are widespread claims like '*opjat integrirujut*' – 'again they are trying to integrate us'). The ethnically connoted nation-state model equates integration with forced acculturation - and as the majority of Estonian Russians do not wish to assimilate, integration for them means something to avoid.

The results of our analyses have an important policy implication. A large body of previous research confirms that aiming at parity and mutual accommodation would be beneficial not only for immigrants and ethnic minorities, but to the larger society as well (Berry 2008). Thus, we would like to conclude that it is in the national interest of Estonia to establish institutions aiming to decrease the ethnic connotation of the current nation-state model, in order to be able to build up a more equitable inter-ethnic relationship in this country. In this way, those who now opt for integration or diffuse models could find a positive place in Estonia. Such a policy would be consistent also with the EU common basic principles on integration, which stipulate that 'Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States' (EU Commission 2005).

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Appendix 1. Initial indicators and description of formation of summarized items

Scale					
1.Inequality of economical possibilities Cronbach's *alpha* 0.83	K39. Would you agree that non-Estonians with equal qualifications have equal possibilities with Estonians to achieve the following goals in Estonia?				
D	Achieving success in business	1 Mostly yes	2 Often Yes	3 Often No	4 Mostly No
F	Getting higher education	1 Mostly yes	2 Often Yes	3 Often No	4 Mostly No
G	Starting a business	1 Mostly yes	2 Often Yes	3 Often No	4 Mostly No
H	Getting equal salaries for equivalent jobs	1 Mostly yes	2 Often Yes	3 Often No	4 Mostly No
I	Getting social subsidies	1 Mostly yes	2 Often Yes	3 Often No	4 Mostly No
2.Inequality of career possibilities Cronbach's *alpha* 0.86	K39. Would you agree that non-Estonians with equal qualifications have equal possibilities with Estonians to achieve the following goals in Estonia?				
A	Getting a professional job	1 Mostly yes	2 Often Yes	3 Often No	4 Mostly No
B	Getting a job in a state institution	1 Mostly yes	2 Often Yes	3 Often No	4 Mostly No
C	Achieving a leading position	1 Mostly yes	2 Often Yes	3 Often No	4 Mostly No
E	Achieving success in politics	1 Mostly yes	2 Often Yes	3 Often No	4 Mostly No

Appendix 1. (Continued)

Scale					
3.Satisfaction with the economical situation Cronbach's *alpha* 0.63	K40. How satisfied are you with your present economical situation?	1 Not satisfied at all	2 Not especially satisfied	3 Rather satisfied	4 Totally satisfied	
	K46. What have you done during the ast two years and what are you planning to do in the nearest future to manage your life better?					
O	Living more economically	1 Yes I have	2 No I haven't but I will	3 No I haven't and I will not		
P	Buying second hand clothes	1 Yes I have	2 No I haven't but I will	3 No I haven't and I will not		
4.The position of Russians in Estonian society Cronbach's *alpha* 0.59	K25. How do you evaluate the position of Estonians and non –Estonians in the Estonian society?	1 Estonian noticeably higher	2 Estonian a little higher	3 Equal	4 Non-Estonian a little higher	5 Non-Estonian noticeably higher
	KP26. Dou you consider the lifestyle/way of thinking of Estonians to be different from yours?	1 Very different	2 Rather different	3 Rather similar	4 Very similar	
	K57. Are the non-Estonians living in Estonia in a bigger risk of losing their jobs compared to Estonians?	1 Definitely	2 Probably yes	3 Probably not	4 Definitely not	

Appendix 1. (Continued)

Scale				
5.Threat to Russian language and culture Cronbach's *alpha* 0.42	K11 According to the present laws students of Russian high schools will learn 60% of the subjects in Estonian and 40% in Russian as of the beginning of the year 2007. What is your opinion? KP35 Which of the following circumstances will most endanger the Russians' future in Estonia.	1 This is a good decision	2 I have doubts in the positive effects of this decision	
2	Vanishing of national culture and weakening of national feeling	1 Doesn't endager	2 Still in danger	3 Endangers the most
12	Weakening of the importance of the Russian spoken language	1 Doesn't endager	2 Still in danger	3 Endangers the most
6. Frustration from the lack of knowledge of the Russian language	KP10 How disturbed (or not disturbed) are you by the lack of knowledge of the Russian language among Estonians in Estonia?	1 Not at all	2 A little	3 Very much

Appendix 1. (Continued)

Scale					
7.Contact with the majority group Cronbach's *alpha* 0.42	KV16. The Estonian language is actively taught in school and outside of school. Children have friends among Estonians and they interact with Estonians: What can that result in?				
D	Children don't properly know neither Estonian nor Russian	1 This will not happen	2 May happen	3 This will surely happen	
F	Children lose the connection with Russian culture	1 This will not happen	2 May happen	3 This will surely happen	
	KP20. Would you principally go to work or study in a collective where the majority is Estonian?	1 Yes, sure	2 Probably yes	3 Probably not	4 Definitely not
8.Ethnic self-esteem Cronbach's *alpha* 0.71	K23. While answering the following questions we ask you to keep in mind your own ethnic group. Please say how you agree with them by choosing the corresponding number				
A	I often feel proud of being a member of my ethnic group	1 Don't agree at all	2 Don't agree	3 Can't say	4 I agree	5 I totally agree

(Continued)

Appendix 1. (Continued)

Scale						
B	I feel good as a member of my ethnic group	1 Don't agree at all	2 Don't agree	3 Can't say	4 I agree	5 I totally agree
C	My ethnic group is usually respected	1 Don't agree at all	2 Don't agree	3 Can't say	4 I agree	5 I totally agree
9.Interest in Estonian politics Cronbach's *alpha* 0.69	K68.Are you interested in the political events in Estonia?	1 I am not interested	2 I take interest only in some news	3 I take interest in almost everything		
	K71. What would an Estonian inhabitant in your opinion do to help the development of Estonian life in the best way? How important in your opinion is to …					
C	Take part in elections	1 Not important at all	2 Important	3 Important	4 Very important	
F	Be informed of the Estonian politics	1 Not important at all	2 Important	3 Important	4 Very important	
10.Importance of political activity Cronbach's *alpha* 0.79	K71. What could an Estonian inhabitant in your opinion do to help the development of Estonian life in the best way? How important in your opinion is to…					
	Being a member of some party	1 Not important at all	2 Important	3 Important	4 Very important	

(Continued)

Appendix 1. (Continued)

Scale					
	Participating in voluntary organisations (for example nature protection, preservation of antiquities, charitable organisation, trade unions)	1 Not important at all	2 Important	3 Important	4 Very important
11. Evaluation of the integration politics Cronbach's *alpha* 0.74	K32A. How successful has the integration of non-Estonians been in Estonia (the whole country)?	1 Totally un-successful	2 Rather un-successful	3 Rather successful	4 Very successful
	K32B. How successful has the integration in Estonia been in your hometown/ county	1 Totally un-successful	2 Rather un-successful	3 Rather successful	4 Very successful
	K66. How do you evaluate the present citizenship politics?	1 Too unfair for non-Estonians	2 Normal, corresponds with the international demands	3 Too mild, harms the interests of Estonian nationality	
12. Satisfaction with the governing of the state	K73. How satisfied are you with the governing of the Estonian state?	1 Not satisfied at all	2 Not especially satisfied	3 Mostly satisfied	4 Very satisfied

Appendix 2. Description of the results of second order factor analysis

Component	Initial Eigenvalues	% of Variance after Rotation	Cumulative % after Rotation
1	2.726	16.5	16.5
2	1.697	15.0	31.5
3	1.271	13.0	44.5
4	1.100	10.7	55.2
5	0.923	9.1	64.3
6	0.817		
7	0.740		
8	0.706		
9	0.637		
10	0.526		
11	0.436		
12	0.422		

Appendix 3. The four groups by background items

Name of the group	Integration	Diffuse	Separation	Marginalisation
% of total (N=340)	23	23	32	22
Men (%)	61	44	45	40
Age				
Mean age	36	41	46	45
Dominant age group	15-39 (62%)	20-49 (64%)	40-74 (60%)	40-74 (60%)
Inactive in the labour market				
Students, retired	16% students	15% retired, 11% students 9% unemployed	24% retired, 13% students	24% retired, 12% unemployed
Education				
Basic education %	26	26	17	33
Secondary education %	48	55	70	56
Higher education %	26	19	13	11
Born in Estonia %	77	59	41	39
Citizenship				
Estonian citizens %	73	38	46	26
Stateless %	17	43	27	36
Russian citizens %	9	15	26	38
Place of residence				
Tallinn %	29	44	56	39
Ida-Virumaa county %	24	29	24	47
Other regions %	47	27	20	14